

UNCLASSIFIED



**VIDEO SERVICES POLICY  
SECURITY TECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE  
(STIG) OVERVIEW**

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**Developed by DISA for the DoD**

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Executive Summary

The Video Teleconferencing (VTC) Security Technical Implementation Guide (STIG) and Video Services Policy STIG provide the architectural and technical security policies, requirements, and implementation details for applying security concepts to video teleconferencing systems. This works in conjunction with the Voice/Video over IP (VVoIP), Voice Services Policy, Network Infrastructure, supporting application, and appropriate operating system (OS) STIGs to address cybersecurity requirements for systems providing point-to-point and point-to-multipoint video conferencing. This Overview provides background and information specific to the architecture of VTC endpoints, configuration of VTC systems, and includes special considerations for periods processing and classified services.

### 1.2 Authority

DoD Instruction (DoDI) 8500.01 requires that "all IT that receives, processes, stores, displays, or transmits DoD information will be [...] configured [...] consistent with applicable DoD cybersecurity policies, standards, and architectures" and tasks that Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) "develops and maintains control correlation identifiers (CCIs), security requirements guides (SRGs), security technical implementation guides (STIGs), and mobile code risk categories and usage guides that implement and are consistent with DoD cybersecurity policies, standards, architectures, security controls, and validation procedures, with the support of the NSA/CSS, using input from stakeholders, and using automation whenever possible." This document is provided under the authority of DoDI 8500.01.

Although the use of the principles and guidelines in these SRGs/STIGs provide an environment that contributes to the security requirements of DoD systems, applicable NIST SP 800-53 cybersecurity controls need to be applied to all systems and architectures based on the Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS) Instruction (CNSSI) 1253.

### 1.3 Vulnerability Severity Category Code Definitions

Severity Category Codes (referred to as CAT) are a measure of vulnerabilities used to assess a facility or system security posture. Each security policy specified in this document is assigned a Severity Code of CAT I, II, or III.

**Table 1-1: Vulnerability Severity Category Code Definitions**

	DISA Category Code Guidelines
CAT I	Any vulnerability, the exploitation of which will, <b>directly and immediately</b> result in loss of Confidentiality, Availability, or Integrity.
CAT II	Any vulnerability, the exploitation of which <b>has a potential</b> to result in loss of Confidentiality, Availability, or Integrity.
CAT III	Any vulnerability, the existence of which <b>degrades measures</b> to protect against loss of Confidentiality, Availability, or Integrity.

## 1.4 STIG Distribution

Parties within the DoD and Federal Government's computing environments can obtain the applicable STIG from the Information Assurance Support Environment (IASE) website. This site contains the latest copies of any STIGs, SRGs, and other related security information. The address for the IASE site is <http://iase.disa.mil/>.

## 1.5 Document Revisions

Comments or proposed revisions to this document should be sent via email to the following address: [disa.letterkenny.FSO.mbx.stig-customer-support-mailbox@mail.mil](mailto:disa.letterkenny.FSO.mbx.stig-customer-support-mailbox@mail.mil). DISA Field Security Operations (FSO) will coordinate all change requests with the relevant DoD organizations before inclusion in this document. Approved changes will be made in accordance with the DISA FSO maintenance release schedule.



## 2. INTRODUCTION TO VTC TECHNOLOGY

The telecommunications network used for most VTC connectivity is a traditional circuit-switched network such as the Defense Switched Network (DSN) or Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN). The DSN is the preferred network for DoD VTC connectivity, typically providing Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) lines for access using either Basic Rate Interface (BRI) or Primary Rate Interface (PRI).

The bandwidth requirements of VTC systems necessitate the use of one or more ISDN lines from the circuit switch to the VTC location. The ISDN line(s) is (are) interfaced with the CODEC using a modem like device called an Inverse Multiplexer (IMUX). The IMUX also provides the dialing capability required by the network. Some CODECs can interface with an external IMUX to control this dialing capability, while other CODECs contain an internal or integrated IMUX. The protocol used for VTC transmission across the circuit switched network is H.320. The external IMUX is required for secure/classified dial-up sessions across an unclassified ISDN network. This arrangement is discussed later in this document.

VTC systems can also be interconnected via an IP-based network. Currently, the industry is migrating rapidly toward using IP-based connectivity. The protocol that was developed for VTC transmission across an IP-based network is H.323. Some VTC systems are migrating to the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP). However, SIP does not provide all of the VTC control and feature functionality that H.323 does. H.323 and SIP are signaling protocols used for the setup and control of the VTC session. The session content or media is carried across the network using Real Time Protocol (RTP) or Secure RTP (SRTP).

Most CODECs today include both IP and ISDN capabilities. The ISDN capability is provided via serial interfaces for use with an external IMUX or via an onboard IMUX.

### 2.1 Definitions

Before going on with the discussion of VTC technology, its vulnerabilities, and IA requirements, the terms used in this document need to be defined to identify various people and their roles associated with the VTC system and its operation. These are as follows:


- **User:** a user of VTC equipment is one who operates the equipment and/or displays presentations or whiteboard information using the equipment. Users have basic operating privileges. A user is the operator of a conference room based system or the operator of an office based or personal VTC device.
- **Conferee** or **Attendee:** a person attending a VTC in person that is **not** a "user".
- **Participant:** a "user" that is participating in a connected or active VTC session using their VTC equipment. While, in the English language, a participant can be considered a conferee, and vice versa, a distinction is made for the purpose of this document to maintain clarity.
- **Facilitator:** the "user" facilitating the VTC. This person is typically the user that has the knowledge to set up a VTC session but does not participate in it, while other users only operate the devices that display presentations and whiteboard information.
- **Chair:** a "user" who operates the controls of the VTC system and/or the audio visual equipment in a conference room or the person leading a VTC.

- **Administrator:** a person responsible for the proper configuration and management of the VTC system, equipment, or device. An administrator may also serve as, or be referred to as, a "user", "facilitator", or "chair".

## 2.2 VTC Endpoints

A VTC endpoint is the human interface to the overall VTC system.

Figure 2-1: VTC Endpoint Components and Connections



Early cost effective business VTC endpoints were developed and based upon the conference room model. This model is still widely used today and supports conferences having multiple

people at each of the locations in the conference. The video cameras, microphones, speakers, and video display screens are built into the conference room to provide maximum coverage of all people in the room. There may also be an electronic whiteboard or document camera used for the transmission of hand drawn sketches and other physical documents to all conference participants. These types of VTC systems are typically referred to as VTC Suites. VTC suites typically include a complete audio visual control system with controls for room lighting, camera/microphone selection, camera positioning, etc. Some systems also implement the capability for a facilitator or chairperson to control the camera(s) of the remote location. This is called Far End Camera Control (FECC).

Many of VTC endpoints are operated and configured via a wireless remote control that is very similar to a TV remote control. These remote controls are implemented using either infrared (typical) or radio frequency technologies. Endpoints are also able to be controlled and configured using a directly connected Personal Computer (PC) via serial connection or remotely across a LAN. The serial connection may also be used to provide VTC system control from a room audio visual (AV) control system.


Due to the higher bandwidth capabilities of today's CODECs, the size and resolution of today's video displays, and the higher bandwidth capabilities of today's transmission networks, VTC suites are being built to provide the feeling of "presence" as part of the conferee experience. This is called "telepresence". The telepresence experience is designed to make the conferees feel as if the individuals at the distant location are sitting across the conference table in the same conference room with them. Telepresence systems typically utilize large high definition flat screen monitors placed along what is perceived as the centerline of a conference table. Cameras and these monitors are positioned such that an almost life-size image of a remote conferee is displayed in a normally spaced seat location around the perceived conference table. Telepresence is touted as the next frontier for VTC. Many vendors such as Cisco, HP, Polycom, Tandberg, and others have developed telepresence solutions. Point-to-point HD telepresence connections typically require 8Mbps bandwidth.

Today's trend toward miniaturization and reduction of system footprint, as well as today's lower cost of manufacturing electronic devices, is making the proliferation of personal VC devices cost effective. Systems have been developed that combine the video display screens, cameras, microphones, speakers, CODEC, and IMUX (or various combinations thereof) into a single unit. These units have the capability to dial a phone number using the wireless remote control and sometimes via an on-screen dial-pad.

The dream of a cost effective "videophone" is now being realized from several vendors. The definition of videophone is the combination of a telephone instrument having a handset and dial-pad with a video camera and display. The combined unit described in the previous paragraph does not have the handset portion of a videophone so it can only function as a speakerphone. Some of these products have been developed to signal and interoperate with VoIP telephone systems to provide videophone functionality in conjunction with a VoIP telephone instrument. Some of these devices do have the handset and physical dial-pad and can be used as a phone without the video.

Figure 2-2 shows the basic components of a VTC endpoint along with its dial-up and IP-based connectivity options. It must be noted that some VTUs support one connectivity type or the other, while some support both. Additionally, the IMUX may be integrated into the CODEC.

**Figure 2-2: Point-to-Point VTC Connectivity**



In addition to a room based system as described above, a VTU can take various forms as follows:

- "Integrator systems" consist of the individual piece parts used to implement built-in room-based systems as described above.
- Mobile "Large Room" or "Small Room / executive" systems can include one or two video monitors, including speakers, mounted on a cart or pedestal. These are typically packaged systems. The size of the monitors used dictates the type of system (large vs. small/executive). Some of these systems have the CODEC and IMUX mounted separately in the base cabinet with the camera on top of the display. Others utilize a set-top VTU (combined CODEC and IMUX) as described next.
- A Set-Top VTU integrates the CODEC/IMUX, camera, microphone, and sometimes the speaker(s) into a single unit. These are available for use with customer-provided monitor(s) and speaker(s). These devices are designed to sit on top of the monitor(s), ergo their name.
- Desktop VTUs combine all the parts of the VTC system into a single device that looks like and is typically the size of a PC workstation Liquid-Crystal Display (LCD) display or

small flat screen television. These appliances are small enough to sit on the user's desk, ergo the name Desktop VTU.

- Videophone: Some desktop VTUs include a telephone dial-pad and integrate with a VoIP telephone system. Such a device is called a videophone.
- PC-based VTU or soft-VTU: A PC workstation can function as a VTC endpoint using a software application along with additional accessories or peripherals. These applications in combination with the PC workstation and its peripherals can be called a soft-VTU or PC soft-VTU. The PC workstation can be a portable PC (i.e., laptop). The communications are typically carried over an IP-based network, while some applications are bundled with a PC adaptor card that is an ISDN interface. Such an interface card may also contain a dedicated CODEC. These applications typically use a USB-connected camera (i.e., "webcam") along with the PC's native video monitor, sound card, microphone, and speakers. Microphone(s) and/or speaker(s) can be embedded devices as found in a portable PC or PC monitor, while they can also be external standalone devices. For better audio quality, some higher quality webcams include a high quality microphone. The microphone and speaker(s) can also be contained in a headset which can provide some enhanced audio confidentiality. Cameras have typically been standalone devices; however, they are also being embedded in laptop screens. While the standalone camera can be a simple USB webcam it can also be a more sophisticated device such as those produced by VTC system vendors. PC workstation VTC applications go by different names. Confusingly, some vendors market their PC-based solutions as "desktop video systems" or "desktop VTC" since it integrates with the Windows operating system "desktop". This is a misnomer which confuses them with hardware-based devices that sit on a desk (i.e., desktop VTUs) and are also called desktop VTC units. Names like "PC VTC", "soft-VTC", or "Personal VTC" are more appropriate for these software-based VTUs. A soft-VTU is much like a PC soft-phone; a software application that runs on a personal computer and uses the computer's resources and peripherals to provide the voice telephone service. Other PC-based applications such as unified communications and/or collaboration suites are subject to the same or similar requirements since they typically include video conferencing, as well as telephone capabilities.

### 2.3 Point-to-Point Communications or Conferences

VTC endpoints may communicate one-to-one (i.e., in pairs) when connected directly to one another via whatever network is being used for transport. To initiate the "call", the "calling" endpoint user only needs to know the phone number (ISDN), IP address, Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) (a.k.a., Universal or Uniform Resource Locator (URL)), or TElephone NUmber Mapping (ENUM)/E.164 IP resolvable phone number of the distant endpoint.

### 2.4 Multipoint Conferences

Multiple VTC endpoints (three or more) may also communicate with one another with the assistance of a Multipoint Control Unit (MCU). The function of this unit is similar to an audio conferencing bridge with the addition of bridging the video. Each EI calls into the bridge to get connected to the conference. The MCU essentially receives all audio, video, and presentation/whiteboarding streams, then regenerates and retransmits them to all connected

systems such that communications quality is maintained. In some instances, the MCU can also "call" an endpoint to join it to a conference.

In addition to the MCU, H.323 gatekeepers provide MCU access control and authentication of IP-based endpoints. Conference scheduling/reservation/registration systems are used in conjunction with the gatekeeper such that the MCU resources are controlled and not overloaded. The scheduling/reservation/registration systems are accessed via a helpdesk operator or directly by the conference organizer using a web browser on their workstation. Typically, endpoints must be pre-registered with the gatekeeper before being able to gain access to the MCU and join conferences. Organizers must also be registered with the scheduling system.

Some VTC endpoint CODECs have an integrated MCU that can support a limited number of endpoints (typically four to six). Some of these MCUs can also conference in audio only telephone calls. Bandwidth requirements of course are higher for the endpoint hosting a multipoint conference in this manner.

## 2.5 Ad hoc Conferences

The term "ad hoc" as it relates to VTC refers to conferences being established on the spur of the moment without scheduling in advance. An example of this is when one user/endpoint calls another user/endpoint directly in a point-to-point manner. Small ad hoc multipoint conferences can be supported by many of today's VTUs using their integrated MCU. These integrated MCUs are prevalent in today's desktop and small room/executive conference systems and typically support four to six VTC endpoints. Some can also conference voice only telephones. This ad hoc functionality exists since there is generally no need to schedule MCU facilities. Ad hoc conferences are usually initiated by the originator calling the other participants and joining them to the conference, however some VTUs can support dial-in joining.

Care must be taken by LAN designers and administrators when planning to support a VTU that will use its MCU capability because of the additional bandwidth requirements. The LAN connections and equipment supporting the VTU will need to support three (or more) times the bandwidth needed by a point-to-point call if the capacity of the MCU is utilized. A VTU that hosts a multipoint conference with three other VTUs operating at a nominal bandwidth of 384 Kbps for each attached VTU will require 1.152 Mbps to support the conference and maintain good quality audio and video. If a higher definition VTU is used, higher bandwidth is required. While 384 Kbps is needed for fair quality, many of today's VTUs default to 768 Kbps.

Additionally, if the access circuit connecting the LAN to the WAN is small, it can be clogged by this traffic. If the three hosted endpoints are external to the LAN and the LAN is connected to the WAN with a T1 having 1.544 Mbps, the access circuit capacity is almost filled (exceeded if 768 kbps) this will slow LAN data traffic flowing to and from the WAN while the conference is in progress while the data traffic could affect quality of the VTC. If the conference is established between high definition VTUs, the capacity of the access circuit is exceeded. It must also be noted that some VTUs can also reduce the bandwidth requirement for each of the joined calls, so that bandwidth requirements are reduced.

This is different from multipoint calls using a central MCU and gatekeeper since the use of the facilities supporting such calls must be available and typically such usage is scheduled. Some MCU/gatekeeper systems can support ad hoc multipoint conferences but this capability requires additional bandwidth into and out of the MCU, as well as additional ports over and above that required for scheduled conferences. While this is a desired feature in centralized MCU facilities, this function relies heavily on the availability of MCU resources and over provisioning.

**Figure 2-3: Multipoint VTC Connectivity**




Figure 2-3 illustrates the multipoint conference concept, as well as the various scheduling methods.

## 2.6 VTC as a C2 Communications Media

Command and Control (C2) communications requires assured service. The term "assured service" means that the delivery and availability of information or communications is assured or guaranteed. In a network, this translates to the allocation of bandwidth and resources on demand based on precedence consistent with mission needs based on situational awareness. It allows for

preempting bandwidth and resources assigned to lower precedence sessions, so the bandwidth can be used for higher precedence sessions during a crisis.

Classically, the DoD TDM based telephony network (the DSN) has supported assured service by having a relatively robust inter-switch trunk (IST) backbone combined with the ability to identify the priority of a call and pre-empt lower priority calls with higher priority calls both on the line and trunk sides of a telephone switch. This capability is referred to as Multi-Level Precedence and Priority (MLPP).

Traditional VTC connections that use ISDN lines provided by a DSN switch and supported by the DSN backbone trunks can and do support reliable C2 Communications to include precedence calls by applying MLPP. This is supported in a point-to-point or multipoint configuration providing the conference is connected within the DSN. The capability is a function of the network and not the endpoints. Other traditional TDM based networks, such as the PSTN do not support assured service or MLPP.

IP-based networks are not designed to provide assured service. The IP protocol and the supporting network are designed to provide "best effort" delivery of network traffic. This works fine for typical data traffic, however, it is not so fine for Real Time Service (RTS) traffic, such as voice and video. Voice and video require that the packets containing the media streams are delivered with minimal packet loss, delay (latency), and/or jitter. Packet delivery problems develop when congestion occurs within network elements (equipment) and/or the connections between the elements. One way that network designers try to overcome the lack of assured service (or in other words assured delivery of packets) is to beef up the bandwidth handling capability of the network elements and their interconnections. This is, however, only part of the solution. Priority delivery of packets can be achieved by the application of Quality of Service (QOS) and Differential Service Code Point (DSCP) tagging which allows network routers and switches to forward packets on a priority basis. Another part of the IP-based assured service equation is network redundancy along with the ability of network elements to sense where problems exist in the network so that packets can be routed around them. Finally, the concept of "admission control" must be exercised to ensure that no more calls are accepted into the network than the network can handle without degrading the quality of all calls.

While QOS and DSCP have been available for some time, the implementation of these capabilities in IP-based network elements is relatively new. While newer equipment can provide and support these capabilities, there is still a lot of older equipment in use today that does not support them. On the other hand, some endpoints have supported these capabilities for some time now, waiting for the supporting networks to catch up.

Another capability required for DoD assured service for voice and video is the capability to signal the priority of a call to call processing element. This is under development by DISA engineering and the RTS work group in collaboration with major DoD telephony system vendors. The capability is supported by an extension of the SIP protocol which is called Assured Services SIP (AS-SIP).



IP-based VTC systems and networks do not provide "assured service". That is they cannot guarantee the quality of the video and audio communications and they cannot guarantee that a connection between VTUs can be established or maintained for the duration of a call. While some may be capable of using QOS and DSCP tagging, they cannot signal the priority of a call.

As such, IP-based VTC should not be relied upon for critical C2 communications that require assured service or the guarantee that the communication is heard, seen, and understood. This reality and limitation must be reflected in user training and user agreements.

As the infrastructure and vendor's products mature, required capabilities are built-in and new products deployed, assured service will not be an issue.

## **2.7 Classified/Unclassified or Secure/Non-Secure Conferencing Systems**

The Federal Government and DoD have long utilized dial-up VTC endpoints to provide both unclassified and classified VTC communications across unclassified voice networks, such as the DSN and PSTN. Federal interoperability standards were published in 1998 as FTR-1080A-1998 which adopted H.320 as the protocol of choice for Federal and DoD VTC systems. This regulation detailed the use of H.320 over ISDN in both classified (secure) and unclassified (non-secure) modes of operation for both endpoints and MCUs. FTR 1080 was revised in 2002 as FTR 1080B-2002, which superseded FTR-1080A-1998. It updated the use of H.320/ISDN and embraced the use of H.323 over packet networks. H.323 security and confidentiality was not addressed and was deferred to a future release.

Dial-up VTC utilizes the unclassified voice network for transport, but can provide classified communications. This is done using special equipment in the VTU including a NSA type 1 encryptor. This encryptor can be switched into, or out of, the communications path to provide both classified and unclassified communications.

Secure Dial-up VTC equipment processes classified discussions and pictures in the form of digital audio and video, then transmits this information over a typically non-secured network, such as the PSTN or DSN. These systems utilize Type 1 encryption devices to secure these signals on the transmission media. Since classified information is involved in an un-encrypted and encrypted state within the VTC equipment or system, RED/BLACK separation requirements are involved. The un-encrypted information, wiring, and processing equipment are considered RED while the encrypted information, wiring, and processing equipment are considered BLACK. NSTISSAM TEMPEST-2-95 provides guidance for RED/BLACK separation.

A single IP-based VTU can also provide both classified and unclassified communications. Switching between networks can be performed by an approved, specialized, A/B switch that connects the VTU to one network or the other while maintaining the separation between the classified and unclassified networks.

Only devices manufactured and tested or certified for the purpose of providing RED/BLACK isolation should be used in secure VTC systems. This statement relates to dial isolators, KIV-19 hardware handshake lead bypass, time synch isolation, and/or secure/non-secure switches. This recommendation might preclude the use of off-the-shelf optical isolators for EIA-530 handshake

lead bypass (or commonly manufactured A/B switches for secure/non-secure switching) that have not been pre-tested for the purpose.

Recently, various organizations with the DoD have expressed a desire to more efficiently utilize their VTC systems by switching them between networks having different classifications. This can be accommodated; however, it is imperative that at no time can a VTC system be connected to networks with different classification levels or dissemination caveats. Switching between networks having different classification levels is performed by an approved, specialized A/B switch that meets very specific port isolation and TEMPEST criteria.

### 2.7.1 Periods Processing

Periods Processing, as it relates to VTC systems, is the sequential operation of a CODEC to host classified and unclassified video conferences at distinctly different times. During a classified session, the CODEC audio and video streams are classified information while other information, such as IP Addresses, call logs, call data records, and address books/directories are sensitive but unclassified information which could become classified when sufficient information is compiled.

All residual data (data that is unintentionally left behind on computer media) must be cleared before transitioning from one period/network to the next. Since the equipment is re-used, non-destructive techniques are used.

According to NIST Special Publication 800-88, "Clearing information is a level of media sanitization that would protect the confidentiality of information against a robust keyboard attack. Simple deletion of items would not suffice for clearing. Clearing must not allow information to be retrieved by data, disk, or file recovery utilities. It must be resistant to keystroke recovery attempts executed from standard input devices and from data scavenging tools. For example, overwriting is an acceptable method for clearing media."

Once a classified session is complete, the VTC Operator/Administrator must sanitize the unit between conferences.

1. Disconnect the CODEC from the network to go to a transition state. This is performed either by manual disconnection or switching the CODEC to an unused (unconnected) switch position of the A/B, A/B/C, or A/B/C/D switch.
2. Remove residual information. Sanitize residual information stored on volatile memory and clear non-volatile memory.
  - For volatile memory - remove all power for a minimum of 60 seconds. Powering off the CODEC for 60 seconds is sufficient to discharge the capacitors and erase all data.
  - For non-volatile memory - overwrite data; the preferred method is to overwrite all locations with a random character, a specified character, then its complement. Overwriting all locations with null data is allowed.

Persistent memory (i.e., flash memory) is considered non-volatile memory. Read-Only Memory (ROM), Programmable ROM (PROM), or Erasable PROM (EPROM), and their variants that have been programmed at the vendor's manufacturing facility (i.e., system IOS), and are considered to be unalterable in the field, do not need to be cleared.

- Coordinate with vendor/solutions provider and certifier to ensure all residual information is cleared based on equipment make and model.
  - Remove storage media with different classification levels; equipment with non-removable storage media is not allowed for periods processing.
3. Verify there is NO RESIDUAL INFORMATION on the CODEC and attached peripherals.
  4. Load/configure the required parameters for the next session.
  5. Connect to the network of the next session.

Some units may have the capability to sanitize all memory as part of a factory reset. A factory reset is the software restore of an electronic device to its original system state by erasing all of the information stored on the device to its original factory or unconfigured settings. This erases all of the data, settings, and applications that were previously on the device. Also, it is possible for an automated configuration management system to sanitize the unit by using an automated (i.e., scripted) process. It is important that this process be tested and verified before it is used. As a last resort, these steps can be performed manually by the VTC Operator or Administrator, however, since it is a manual process, the possibility of an error occurring is greater.

### 3. VTU/VTC ENDPOINT SECURITY

Like most of today's electronic devices, VTC endpoints are typically not configured securely out of the box. If a user is security conscious, physical and operational security measures must be employed or placed around the system and technical measures must be configured on the system if supported.

The primary IA issue with VTC endpoints is confidentiality. This issue relates, not only to the confidentiality of VTC traffic on the network, but also to the confidentiality of the collateral information in the room in which the VTU is placed.

Tightly coupled with the confidentiality issue is the issue of minimal access control capabilities and the capability of a VTU to be easily compromised and remotely controlled over an IP network. Access control must be properly controlled and configured on the VTU. Unfortunately, some VTUs have been able to be compromised even if they are configured properly. Because these vulnerabilities are more prevalent in the Ethernet/IP based VTU implementations, extra consideration must be given to the network architecture supporting the VTU, as well as the configuration of the device itself.

The vulnerabilities addressed in this document can differ depending upon the network or networks to which the VTU is connected. A VTU is much more vulnerable if it is connected to an Ethernet/IP network for whatever purpose than it is if it is only connected to an ISDN network. Additionally, the existence a VTC endpoint can present differing levels of vulnerability to different locations. A VTC endpoint located in an office or other normal work area typically presents more risk than if it was located in a conference room.

The confidentiality of the VTC traffic on the network must be considered since it can be captured by simple, properly placed, network testing tools, some of which are free. Encryption is the best mitigation for this vulnerability; however, network configuration also plays a part.

Again, the vulnerabilities noted here are more of an issue with Ethernet/IP based VTU implementations than with dial-up ISDN implementations due to the ease of compromise via the IP network. This holds true unless the dial-up system is also connected to an IP network for management purposes.

Finally, operational measures need to be employed to minimize the confidentiality issues that arise from placing and operating a VTU in a room. A VTU places "eyes and ears" in any space or room where it is installed. These "eyes and ears" could be active without a user's knowledge if the VTU is compromised or in certain normal operational modes.

The following subsections will discuss these vulnerabilities, risks, and policy issues, along with the IA requirements necessary to mitigate today's vulnerabilities to the greatest extent possible within the limited capabilities of today's VTUs. Some additional guidance will be provided which is intended to migrate toward minimal compliance with DoD policy in the future. This forward looking guidance is not intended to be all inclusive. Additional guidance will be provided in the future. Technical measures will be addressed in the areas of device configuration and network architecture/configuration. Non-technical measures will also be addressed, such as

Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), vulnerability awareness, user/administrator/helpdesk training, user agreements, and user guides.

In general, when VTC systems are implemented, consideration must be given to mission benefits weighed against operational risks and the possibility of improper disclosure of information. This applies to facilities based, desktop based, and PC based systems and devices.

### **3.1 DoD Access Control and Auditing Policy Compliance**

DoD user/administrator account and password requirements are defined by the DoDI 8500.2 IA control IAIA-1, IAIA-2, IAAC-1, IAGA-1, as well as Cyber Command Tasking Order (CTO) issuances, as amended, and any current INFOCON modifications. IA controls ECLO-1 and 2 provide policy for system/device logon controls, while IATS-1 and 2 provide policy requiring DoD Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) certificates along with physical tokens (i.e., Common Access Card (CAC) or Alternate Logon Token (ALT)) be used for system/device access, user identification, authentication, and non-repudiation. These policies address individual user/administrator accounts and user-IDs; two-factor authentication using CAC, other PKI based tokens (i.e., ALT), or the use of passwords; password strength; password history; password and account aging and lockout; account lockout for failed logon attempts; removal of unnecessary accounts; group accounts, and more. IA controls ECPS-1 and ECLP-1 define policy for various levels of user and administrator authorization based on roles and the principal of least privilege.

Additionally, IA controls ECAT-1, ECAR-1, 2, and 3, as well as ECTP-1 define DoD security auditing policy. Under these policies, user and administrator actions that could affect security are to be recorded in a protected security or audit log. These IA controls rely on the successful implementation of individual user accounts and other required access control measures. Without individual user accounts and/or identities to which actions can be tied, auditing of user/administrator actions becomes impossible. Examples of auditable actions include (but are not limited to) access to the system or device; access to, use of, or activation of services provided by the system or device; access to files on the system or device to include modification, deletion, name changes etc.; access to configuration settings along with changes made. These auditing records are in addition to and separate from traditional telephony CDRs used for accounting purposes.

### **3.2 Confidentiality**

Both operational controls and technical controls are required to ensure the best possible confidentiality of conference content (i.e., the information discussed or viewed) and of the information in the space in which a VTU is installed (i.e., non-conference or "collateral" information within view of a camera or range of the microphone), as well as the information contained on a presenter's workstation (i.e., information contained in files or open windows other than those being presented to the conference). The following subsections will deal with the requirements necessary to ensure the confidentiality of non-conference information and conference content including the media streams. Subsequent sections will discuss and define additional requirements to help with ensuring this confidentiality. These additional requirements will address CODEC configuration measures, network configuration measures, and other issues.

### 3.2.1 Confidentiality of Information in the Physical Environment

The VTU in itself presents a great vulnerability to the confidentiality of information in the physical environment in which it is installed. The information in question is the "collateral" information within the audio and video pickup range of the endpoint. The simple introduction of a VTU (i.e., VTC endpoint) into a room degrades the security posture of that room. This is because this endpoint places "eyes and ears" in the physical environment. The "eyes" are the cameras while the "ears" are the microphones. If not properly configured and operated, sensitive or classified information may be unintentionally disclosed to entities that do not have proper clearance or a need-to-know. This could be more of a concern in offices and work areas where sensitive or classified work is performed and discussed than in conference rooms, however, the vulnerability applies to both areas. This is because sensitive or classified information is not typically hung on the walls of a conference room, except during a conference, but may be in an office, cube, or other work area. On the other hand, if a conference room is only used for VTC conferences, and there are no other meetings held there and the room contains no sensitive or classified information when not in use, there is little or no vulnerability.

If the endpoint is not properly configured to prevent compromise or unintentional/unauthorized access, a room can be visually and/or aurally monitored from a remote location, and in some instances, without detection by the occupants of the space. Non-fixed cameras can be remotely controlled (i.e., panned, tilted, and zoomed) without the room occupants being aware unless they spot the movement. A microphone can also be remotely activated. VTC system microphone sensitivity is very high and can typically pick up a relatively quiet conversation from across a room. This places occupant activities and conversations at risk of disclosure to unknown entities. A VTU located in an office space or on a desktop could capture the space occupant's conversations, one side of their telephone calls (both sides if a speakerphone is used), and/or video of the occupant performing his/her regular activities. While this could be considered a privacy issue, if the workspace is one where sensitive or classified information is used, discussed, or posted on the wall in view of the camera, this information can also be captured. All of this captured information can be disclosed to individuals without a validated need-to-know or proper security clearance. Consideration must be given to the operation and configuration of a VTU in the context of the physical environment in which it is installed. This consideration must include answering the question: who's watching you or who could potentially be watching and/or listening.

The most common and easiest avenue for unintentional/unauthorized access and/or compromise of a VTU is via the Ethernet/IP interface. While a VTU can be compromised, as described above, via ISDN using a combination of "auto answer" and far end camera control, there are many more ways to do it via the IP interface.

### 3.2.2 Confidentiality while the VTU is Inactive/in Standby

For the purpose of this document, a VTU being "inactive" means it is NOT actively participating in a VTC session but it is powered on. This could be considered a "standby" mode of operation. Conversely, a VTU being "active" means it is actively participating in a VTC session. "Inactive" could include both "standby" and "sleep" modes of operation. Sleep mode is a power conservation and semi-disabled state that the VTU might enter after being on standby for a

period of time. While in sleep mode, the VTU is still minimally powered and thereby could be remotely accessed, compromised, or easily activated.

A VTU that is powered on and in an "inactive" mode but is not appropriately disabled (and configured) presents a vulnerability to the following:

- Meetings held in a conference room in which a VTU is installed but that does not require the use of the VTU to participate in a VTC.
- Activities and information located in an office or other work area in which a VTU is installed that is within range of the VTU when the VTU is not participating in a VTC.

### **3.2.2.1 Power-Off the VTU When Inactive**

When the VTU is not active, it is best to power it off to mitigate the issues addressed here. This may not be practical, particularly if the VTU is intended, or required, to receive un-scheduled incoming calls or is to be remotely managed/monitored in an un-scheduled manner. Receiving automatically answered unscheduled incoming calls is a vulnerability. This is an issue for IP and ISDN connected systems if auto-answer is on. The auto-answer feature is discussed later. Remote access and monitoring are also vulnerabilities due to the lack of strong access control mechanisms and the ease with which a VTU can be compromised if it is connected to an IP network. These vulnerabilities are discussed later. The point of this and the next requirement is to disable the capability of the VTU to "see and hear" information and activities located or occurring near the VTU when it is not actively participating in a call. While these vulnerabilities are of particular concern in an office or other work area, it may be of less concern in a conference room except if meetings occur in the facility that do not require the use of the VTC system.

### **3.2.2.2 Disable the VTU When Powered & Inactive**

In the event that mission requirements dictate the VTU be in a powered-on state when inactive (thereby overriding RTS-VTC 1020), other measures are required to mitigate the vulnerability of possible VTU compromise and establish a defense in depth posture. These mitigations are: 1) to mute the microphone and 2) to disable the viewing capability of the camera in some manner. If the camera is movable, it could be aimed at the nearest corner of the room, however, this is no mitigation if the VTU is compromised and the camera can be re-aimed into the room. The best mitigation for the camera is to cover the lens. This is applicable to both movable and fixed cameras.

### **3.2.2.3 Sleep Mode**

Sleep mode is the power conservation and semi disabled state that some VTUs can enter after being on standby for a period of time. While in sleep mode, the VTU is still minimally powered and thereby could be remotely accessed, managed, compromised, or easily activated. For the purpose of our discussions, sleep mode is different from standby mode by the fact that in standby mode, by our definition, the VTU is not actively participating in a call but is ready to receive or place a call. Sleep mode is a semi off state whereby most functions of the VTU are disabled to conserve power. If used to mitigate vulnerabilities and not just conserve power, sleep mode must have the characteristics noted in RTS-VTC 1027.00.

#### **3.2.2.4 Incoming Call Notification**

In the event that mission requirements dictate the VTU be in a powered-on state when inactive, the VTU becomes available to receive incoming calls (except possibly when sleeping). Additionally, if a VTU is connected to an IP network, it may be capable of receiving incoming calls while active. When a VTU receives an incoming call, the normal operation is that a notification of the incoming call is provided both audibly and visually. The visual notification typically includes a display of the source of the call. This can be a phone number or IP address. This information should be accompanied by an identification of the caller. While the source information is typically available from the network, the identity of the calling party associated with that information is typically contained in a locally accessible directory. If the source information is in the directory, the associated identity information is located and added to the display or displayed by itself. This directory is typically on the VTU or can be on a locally associated management or directory server. Directories must therefore be kept up to date with user information related to other VTUs with which any given VTU is expected to communicate. Ideally, the full identity of the caller is sent from the calling system for display on the called system even if there is no local directory entry.

Based upon the displayed information, the user of the VTU can make an informed decision and take appropriate action to answer the call or not. Users must be trained to not answer calls from unknown sources in the event doing so could disclose sensitive or classified information in the area of the VTU or while engaged in a VTC session.

#### **3.2.2.5 Auto-Answer Availability**

Some VTC endpoints have a user selectable feature that provides the capability to automatically answer an incoming call. This would be akin to your speakerphone picking up a call each time the phone rang allowing an ongoing conversation to be heard by the caller. This feature, if activated, is highly detrimental to the confidentiality of information in a room in which a VTU is installed. In fact, a security incident could result from "auto-answer" being enabled. Such would be the case in the event a VTU automatically answered a call when a classified meeting or discussion (not via VTC) was being held in a conference room or an office having VTC capability. The auto-answer feature must not be activated by a user unless the feature is required to satisfy mission requirements. Furthermore, users must be trained in the vulnerabilities associated with the auto-answer feature and in its proper use if it is to be used. The ideal mitigation for this vulnerability is for the auto-answer feature to not be supported by the VTU or there be an administrator setting that can disable the feature preventing a user from activating it.

#### **3.2.2.6 Auto-Answer Use Mitigations**

In the event the auto-answer feature is approved for use or cannot be administratively disabled and thus is available for users to activate, several mitigating requirements must be met. The first of these is that the user(s) to which the feature is available must be trained in its proper use and in the vulnerabilities it presents because the user is the one that must implement the operational mitigations. The second is the VTU must answer the call with the microphone muted and with the camera covered or disabled. This will prevent an ongoing conversation from being heard and room activities seen by the caller. This will also prevent the room from being audibly and visually monitored if a call is automatically answered when the VTU is un-attended. The third



mitigating requirement is that the user must be notified that the VTU has received and answered a call such that the user may be viewed if the camera is not/cannot be covered or listened to if the microphone is not/cannot be muted. This means that a noticeable visual indication must be provided and any available audible signal must be maintained at an audible level so it can be heard.

### **3.2.3 Confidentiality While the VTU is Active**

As noted earlier, a VTU being "active" means it is actively participating in a VTC session. There are several issues to be aware of or vulnerabilities to be mitigated while the VTU is active. These are discussed in the following subsections.

#### **3.2.3.1 Audio Pickup and Broadcast SOP**

Microphones used with VTC systems and devices are designed to be extremely sensitive such that people speaking anywhere within a conference room is picked up and amplified so they can be heard clearly and understood at the remote location(s) on the call. This same sensitivity is included in VTUs that are used in office spaces. This has one disadvantage. The microphones can pick up sidebar conversations and other conversations that have no relationship to the conference or call in progress. Likewise, in an open area, received conference audio can be broadcast to others in the area that are not part of the conference, and possibly should not be exposed to the conference information for need-to-know reasons. Speakerphones exhibit a similar vulnerability. This is the same confidentiality vulnerability posed to information in the environment as discussed above with the added twist that the conference audio is vulnerable to others in the environment. While this is more of an issue in environments where classified conversations normally occur, it is also an issue in any environment. This is of particular concern in open work areas or open offices where multiple people work in near proximity. Users or operators of VTC systems of any type must take care regarding who can hear what is being said during a conference call and what unrelated conversations can be picked up by the sensitive microphone(s). Where a VTU is used by a single person in an open area, a partial mitigation for this could be the use of a headset with earphones and a microphone. While this would limit the ability of others to hear audio from the conference and could also limit the audio pickup of unrelated conversations, it may not be fully effective. In some instances, such as when a VTU is located in a SCIF, a Push-to-Talk (PTT) handset/headset may be required.

This SOP should take into account the classification of the area where the VTU is installed, as well as the classification and need-to-know restraints of the information generally communicated via the facility or specific VTU. Along with those mentioned above, measures should be included, such as closing office or conference room doors, muting of microphones before and after conference sessions and during conference breaks, volume levels in open offices as well as muting the microphone when not speaking.

#### **3.2.3.2 Information In View Of the Camera SOP**

Care must be taken by conference room and office based VTU users not to inadvertently display information of a sensitive or classified nature that is not part of the conference proceedings while the VTU is active. This can happen if information in the form of charts, pictures, or maps is displayed on a wall that is within the viewing range of a camera. The pan, tilt, and zoom

capabilities of the camera(s) must be considered. One may think something is out of range, but it may not be due to camera capabilities and video enhancement capabilities for captured frames. Inadvertent displays of information could also happen if the information is laying on a desk or table unprotected.

### **3.2.3.3 Incoming Calls While In a Conference**

As discussed above, whether active or inactive, a VTU must display the source of an incoming call and the caller's identity so the user can decide to answer the call or not. This decision must also be based upon what information would be made available to the caller when the call is answered. The information that would be placed at risk is what can be picked up in the physical area of the VTU or what is being carried by the conference in which it is participating.

If the VTU is participating in a conference already, answering a call while in a conference would activate the VTU's integrated MCU and join the caller to the conference. The possibility of an incoming call being automatically joined to a meeting in progress in this manner places the confidentiality of that meeting at risk. The caller could become a participant of a meeting to which they were not invited and subsequently receive sensitive or classified information for which the caller may or may not have a need-to-know or appropriate security clearance.

As with a VTU in standby mode, an "auto-answer" feature is of great concern during a VTC session. A VTU must be configured in such a way that it cannot automatically answer a call and join the call to an active session without some form of access control. Either user intervention or a properly managed "local meeting" password is required to join such an incoming call to an active session. In some instances the "do-not-disturb" feature may be used by the user to block such calls by returning a "busy" signal. The capability of joining a conference on a VTU using its integrated MCU through the use of a "local meeting" password must be used only when the VTU user needs to pre-schedule and host a multipoint conference on his/her VTU. This capability must not be available at all times. The VTU should have the capability to disable this kind of access when it is not needed. Local meeting passwords must be used one time and not repeated. This requirement is discussed later.

### **3.2.3.4 Disable VTU Remote Monitoring**

Some VTC endpoints support the capability for an administrator or facilitator to view or monitor the VTU location (i.e., the room where it is located) remotely via a web interface. Some VTUs provide this feature via snapshots, while others provide the capability in real time. This feature can also include control capabilities and is used for troubleshooting, checking endpoints and rooms for operational readiness, or active monitoring of a call for quality control, etc. This capability poses a confidentiality issue for active conferences and the information in the proximity of the endpoints. Remote monitoring must be disabled as a general rule unless required to satisfy validated and approved mission requirements to prevent unauthorized access. This discussion also applies to administrator's endpoints fully participating in a call for reasons of troubleshooting or quality control.

### 3.2.3.5 VTU Remote Monitoring Password

Activation and use of remote monitoring and control features, such as those discussed here must be protected by access control. Minimally, this must be the administrator password; however, access to this feature should not give full administrator access.

### 3.2.3.6 Remote Monitoring Notification

Monitoring of a conference or VTC system can be performed in various ways. This can be by accessing the monitoring capabilities of a particular VTU via IP as discussed above, or using a capability of a centralized MCU, or an administrator or "operator/facilitator" can participate in a conference using a VTU. No matter how monitoring is being performed, participants in a call must be notified or be made aware that the call is being monitored by someone that is not a direct participant of the call or conference who therefore may not have a need-to-know regarding the conference information. This is particularly of concern if the monitored conference contains classified information. If the monitoring is done by remotely accessing a VTU, typically, an automated notification is displayed on the VTU being monitored. This indication should also be displayed on all connected endpoints. Minimally, there is an SOP that requires the presence of a person monitoring a conference be announced to the conferees.

### 3.2.3.7 Remote Monitoring Operator Clearance

Administrators or "operators/facilitators" that perform monitoring as discussed in this section must have an appropriate security clearance commensurate with or higher than the classification level of the system and/or the information to which they are exposed.

Additional requirements and/or clarifications regarding remote monitoring features and activities may appear in a future release of this or a related STIG. Some of these may specifically address classified conferences. One such requirement may be the use of a tone to announce the presence of monitoring.

### 3.2.3.8 Far End Camera Control

Many VTC endpoints support Far End Camera Control (FECC). This feature uses H.281 protocol which must be supported by both VTUs. Typically, this is only available during an active VTC session but could be available if the VTU is compromised or if a call is automatically answered. Allowing another conference attendee to take control of your camera can place the confidentiality of non-conference related information at risk. FECC should be disabled to prevent the control of the near end camera by the far end unless required to satisfy validated mission requirements.

## 3.2.4 Conference Media and Signaling Confidentiality

DoDI 8500.2 IA control ECCT-1 for "Enclave and Computing Environment/Encryption for Confidentiality (Sensitive Data in Transit) states "Unclassified, sensitive data transmitted through a commercial or wireless network are encrypted using NIST-certified cryptography (see also DCSR-2)." [ed. DCSR-2 Specified Robustness - Medium; Type-3]

DoDI 8500.2 IA control ECCT-2 for "Enclave and Computing Environment/Encryption for Confidentiality (Classified Data in Transit) states "Classified data transmitted through a network that is cleared to a lower level than the data being transmitted are separately encrypted using NSA-approved cryptography (See also DCSR-3)." [ed. DCSR-3 Specified Robustness - High; NSA Type-1]

Furthermore, DoDI 8500.2 IA control ECNK-1 for Enclave and Computing Environment/Encryption for Need-To-Know states "Information in transit through a network at the same classification level, but which must be separated for need-to-know reasons, is encrypted, at a minimum, with NIST-certified cryptography. This is in addition to ECCT. (ed. Encryption for confidentiality data in transit)."

DoDI 8500.2 IA control ECCT-2 primarily applies to classified data traversing the IP WAN (i.e., Defense Information Systems Network (DISN)) or other transport media, such as a TDM based circuit switched network. The IP WAN is protected by NSA type 1 encryptors that bulk encrypt the circuits or links that interconnect the local classified enclaves or LANs. Separation of traffic for need-to-know purposes, while traversing these classified IP LANs and links, is covered by IA control ECNK-1. On the other hand, Dial-up VTUs that process classified information implement ECCT-2 by utilizing a NSA type 1 encryptor at each VTU and each port of a MCU if applicable.

The "NIST-certified cryptography" referred to by these IA controls is cryptography validated to Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-2 as validated through the National Institute of Standards (NIST) Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP).

In the early days of VTC, CODECs did not support confidentiality of the media or signaling streams directly. As security and conference confidentiality have become an IA issue in recent years, VTU vendors have standardized on DES and then AES as encryption standards for VTC media streams. H.235 has been developed to help to secure the signaling protocols used in the H.323 suite of protocols.

#### **3.2.4.1 Encryption of Signaling and Signaling Security**

The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) has developed H.235, which is the security recommendation for H.323 and other H.245 based systems. This recommendation provides for user identification rather than device identification. User identification can be simple or utilize Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). The latter being the goal of the DoD PKI policy. H.235 also has the capability and purpose of negotiating encryption and key exchange.

H.235 security ensures the authentication of each endpoint and the integrity of messages. The basis of the security process is the shared secret between the endpoint and the gatekeeper. This shared secret can be either a password or a key. Only the endpoint and the gatekeeper know the shared secret. Authentication and Integrity are achieved by encrypting part of the entire message using the shared secret. Whenever an endpoint sends a message to the gatekeeper, the endpoint encrypts the message using the password. The gatekeeper authenticates the message using the same password. If one of the parties does not have the correct password, the authentication fails and the call is rejected.

### 3.2.4.2 Encryption of Media

Most if not all VTC media traffic is considered to be sensitive information requiring protection under the IA controls discussed above. ECNK-1 applies to such traffic while traversing any network with any classification level (i.e., NIPRNet, SIPRNet, and JWICS). ECCT-1 specifically applies to such traffic traversing any commercial or wireless network (i.e., Internet, 802.11 WLAN, or cellular network) but should also be considered as a requirement for traversal of the NIPRNet.

At a minimum, if supported by both endpoints in a point-to-point conference, or all endpoints and the MCU in a multipoint conference, the encryption must be used for media encryption. The encryption algorithm required is AES for two reasons. The first is that DES has been cracked and is no longer approved for Federal Government use, and the second is to satisfy DoDI 8500.2 IA control ECCT-1 and ECNK-1; Type-3 encryption of data in transit for confidentiality and need-to-know.

Unfortunately, there is a lot of legacy VTC gear in use today that either only supports DES or has no encryption capability at all. To support this situation, newer CODECs typically have three encryption options ON, OFF, or automatic/negotiate. The preferred setting is ON and should be used if it is known that all other VTUs that a VTU needs to communicate with support encryption. Auto/negotiate is the preferred setting if this is not known.

In reality, however, any encryption, AES or DES, is better than no encryption at all and must be used if available. Many VTUs provide the capability to select the type of encryption used and may also provide an auto-negotiate mode. If it is known that all other VTUs that a VTU needs to communicate with uses AES encryption, AES should be selected. DES should never be selected if AES is available. Auto/negotiate is the preferred setting if it is not known which algorithm the other VTUs will use.

### 3.2.4.3 FIPS 140-2 Validated Encryption

The current DoD requirement for encryption is that the encryption module, which includes a FIPS 197 validated encryption algorithm plus "approved functions" (i.e., key management and sharing/distribution functions), be NIST validated to FIPS 140-2. It must be noted that legacy equipment validated to FIPS 140-1 may still be used and FIPS 140-3 is in development.

While many VTU vendors support AES, they have only validated the algorithm to FIPS-197, if at all. This does not meet the FIPS 140-2 requirement because the additional "approved functions" have not also been addressed.

### 3.2.4.4 Encryption Indicator

In support of the need for encryption and the need for the VTU user to be aware that, in fact, his/her conference session is being encrypted, the VTU must display an indicator that encryption is indeed occurring.

### 3.2.4.5 User Validation Of Encryption

When encryption is enabled via automatic/negotiate, and one endpoint does not support encryption or supports DES and not AES, the entire conference defaults to the lower capability level. This is not acceptable for some conferences depending upon the sensitivity of the information discussed or presented. As noted above, the stated DoD IA controls require encryption. To ensure this requirement is met, when it is unknown whether all endpoints in a conference support encryption and whether it is turned on, the VTU user must provide the final check that encryption is being used. If a conference is to be encrypted, the user must check that all participants are using encryption and have enabled the encryption on their devices. When the conference has begun, the user must ensure the conference is encrypted. The alternate to this is to exclude the endpoint that does not support the required encryption or not proceed with the conference session.

### 3.3 VTC Endpoint Access Control

DoD IS access control requirements for users and administrators are defined in various IA controls in DoDI 8500.2. Account and password requirements are defined by the IA controls IAIA-1, IAIA-2, IAAC-1, IAGA-1, as well as Cyber Command CTOs, and any current INFOCON modifications. Additionally, IA controls ECLO-1 and 2 provide policy for system/device logon, while IATS-1 and 2 provide policy requiring the use of DoD PKI certificates along with CAC/ALT are used for system/device access. These policies address individual user/administrator accounts and passwords, password strength, password history, password and account aging and lockout, account lockout for failed logon attempts, group accounts, and more.

Typically, VTC CODECs do not support most of these requirements on all access points, if at all. Thus, they are easily compromised.

There are typically two methods of accessing a VTU for operational control or administrative reasons. The first is using the hand-held remote control, which is similar to a television remote control. The second is using one of the connections on the CODEC to directly connect an AV system control panel or a PC. The ports used for these purposes are typically the serial (EIA-232) port or the Ethernet port. Additionally, a PC, centralized management server, or emergent AV control panel can be used across an Ethernet/IP network. The EIA-530 and ISDN connections typically do not support operational control or administrative functions; however, at least one vendor provides the capability of upgrading CODEC software over ISDN.

The following subsections will discuss access control requirements regarding VTC endpoints.

#### 3.3.1 Change Default Passwords

DoDI 8500.2 IA controls IAIA-1 and IAIA-2 state, in part: "Ensure all factory set, default, standard or well-known user-IDs and passwords are removed or changed."

Factory default, well-known, and/or manufacturer backdoor accounts and their associated passwords provide easy unauthorized access to system/device. Leaving such accounts and passwords active on a system/device makes it extremely vulnerable to attack and/or other

unauthorized access. As such, they need to be removed, changed, renamed, or otherwise disabled.

Also covered by this policy are "community strings", which act as passwords for monitoring and management of network devices and attached systems via SNMP. The universal default SNMP community strings are "public" and "private" and are well-known.

Default access for VTC operation, local and remote control, and management/configuration purposes is typically unrestricted or minimally protected by well-known and well published default passwords. It has been demonstrated that not changing these passwords is the most common cause of VTC system compromise, making RTS-VTC 2020.00 one of the most important requirements in this STIG.

### **3.3.2 Password Display during Logon**

As any information is entered on a keyboard, the keyboard sends each keystroke to the processing unit which then, typically, echoes the character represented by the keystroke to the display device as feedback to the system's user. Such echoing is done in what is called "clear text" in that what was entered can be read. This process is used for normal typing, but must be changed when entering passwords. When passwords are displayed (echoed) during logon, the risk of password compromise is increased and password confidentiality is greatly reduced. If the password is displayed during logon, it can easily be compromised through the use of a simple technique of shoulder surfing i.e., a third party witnessing the logon (other than the system or user/administrator) could view the echoed password and remember it or write it down. This could also happen through surveillance methods. This presents a major vulnerability to the security or confidential nature of the password. To mitigate this, when entering a password, the characters that are echoed to the display must be something other than the clear text characters. Typically, an asterisk or other punctuation character is used to replace the actual characters in an echoed password. The prevention of shoulder surfing is in support of DoDI 8500.2 IA control IAIA-1's requirement to protect passwords from disclosure.

### **3.3.3 Password/PIN Strength or Complexity**

DoD policy mandates the use of strong passwords. IA control IAIA-1&2 item 2 states "For systems utilizing a logon ID as the individual identifier, ensure passwords are, at a minimum, a case sensitive 8-character mix of upper case letters, lower case letters, numbers, and special characters, including at least one of each (i.e., emPagd2!)."

DoDI 8500.2, therefore, sets the minimum complexity requirement for a character based password. This minimum complexity is reiterated by CJCSM 6510.01, C-A, Section 4 which adds the recommendation that "If technically feasible, 12 to 16 characters using a mix of all four-character sets is recommended (i.e., 14 characters using a mix of all four-character sets in the first 7 characters and the last 7 characters)."

In some circumstances, policies change is the result of Cyber Command CTO issuances which set the minimum password complexity (for systems not using DoD PKI) to 9 characters with "a mix of at least two lowercase letters, two uppercase letters, two numbers, and two special

characters". This policy may again be updated to require 15 characters for some systems or devices that do not support CAC/PKI logon where required.

Additionally, in situations such as when INFOCON levels are raised, additional requirements can be implemented. An example of this is in the recent past, the minimum password length was raised from 9 to 15 characters. When the INFOCON level returned to normal, password length reverted to 9 characters. IA requirements can be increased and decreased in conjunction with adjustments in INFOCON levels. Such adjustments in policy and INFOCON level changes will first be reflected in the checklist associated with an effected STIG and subsequently in a STIG update if the change is permanent.

While VTC endpoints today typically do not require a username, they do require a password for user access and authentication. The strength of these passwords is an issue for VTUs and is dependent upon the method of entry.

The local VTU passwords are entered using the hand-held remote control. The remote control typically has a dial-pad like a telephone and not a full QWERTY keyboard. Using the dial-pad, a user is capable of entering numbers, letters, and two special characters, the \* and # signs. Letter entry requires pressing a number key multiple times to scroll through the number and three or four associated letters until the correct letter is accessed. This is the same as text entry on a cell phone. To ensure accuracy of this process, the characters must be displayed on the screen as they are entered. Another method is to utilize an on-screen keyboard that is navigated using arrow keys on the remote control. While these methods are usable for entering names and other information in places such as the directory, it is not usable for password entry. This is because passwords must not be echoed to the screen to prevent password compromise by another person having a view of the screen while entry is taking place. Additionally, password characters can be shoulder surfed as they are entered if the on-screen keyboard method is used. This reduces the password to a number. It is better to protect a number from shoulder surfing than to require a strong password entered locally. Such a number is considered a Personal Identification Number (PIN) not a password. While there is the possibility of using the \* and # characters, these characters typically signal special functions in some types of systems, particularly telephone systems. These could be used if, during PIN entry, they do not trigger some other function.

Strong passwords along with other measures, as noted in DoD policy, are required for any access method that is received by the VTU across a network. This is because of the potential that a password could be broken by a variety of high speed cracking attacks. Due to the inability to use letters, PINs are very weak passwords. One would think that a PIN should be extra long to make them harder to break. This is not the case if they are not required to be used to access a device remotely across a network. PINs associated with a bank card are only 4 characters because the card is a token that is associated with the PIN. Similarly, DoD CAC cards are tokens with an associated 6 to 8 digit PIN for higher security. Typically, a local VTU PIN entered from a hand-held remote control can support 5 characters, while others can support more which is preferable.

By contrast, most instances of password entry from a remote device or system (i.e., management application/server/terminal/PC, PC for streaming access, pre-configured machine passwords, etc.) can utilize a full keyboard. In this case, such passwords must be in compliance with DoD



policy. VTU password/PIN strength or complexity is therefore dependent upon the entry device. In some cases, a VTU user must enter a "password" through their VTU. In this case, this must be a PIN because of the entry device limitations posed by the hand-held remote control. The mitigation for sending a PIN across the network could be to use it one time and change it. This may not be necessary due to an additional requirement for passwords sent across a network to a remote device per DoDI 8500.2 IA control IAIA-1, which is that they must be encrypted in transit.

### 3.3.4 Passwords for Different VTU Functions

Passwords are required for access control to various functions provided by a VTU. The following is a list of possible functions:

1. Local user device use/activation (not typically supported)
2. Local user call accounting code
3. Local user access to user configurable settings
4. Local user or machine access from the VTU to the user's networked or otherwise attached PC running a presentation or desktop sharing application (or vice versa i.e., PC to VTU) (discussed later)
5. Local administrator access to configuration settings
6. Remote administrator access to configuration settings
7. Remote/centralized VTU management/control system access to the VTU (identifies the management server to the VTU, alternately restricted by IP address)
8. Remote caller access to a VTU integrated MCU conference without local user intervention
9. Remote user access to media streamed from a VTU CODEC
10. Local VTU access to a centralized MCU for joining conferences hosted remotely (i.e., the password sent to the remote MCU)
11. Local VTU access to gatekeeper services (automatically identifies the VTU to the gatekeeper)

The passwords or PINs used for various differing functions must be logically grouped and be unique among other passwords implemented on the system. For example, local user password/PINs such as those in items 1, 2, and 3 could be the same. These would be entered manually using the hand-held remote control. Another logical grouping might be items 10 and 11. The other functions are logically separate because they perform different functions and are used by different entities. One vendor uses a single password pre-configured in the VTU for functions 8 (bidirectional), 9, 10 and possibly 11. This is a problem for two reasons. The first was stated above, it is used for different functions, and secondly, it is preprogrammed into the VTU which is in violation of DoDI 8500.2 IA control IAIA-1 that states in part passwords "are not embedded in access scripts or stored on function keys." While a machine can have an identity or password that identifies itself to another machine for passing controlled information (i.e., routing between the machines or i.e., passing routing tables between routers), such a password cannot be used to provide user level access to information. The user must enter this password manually. A VTC related application of machine to machine authentication would be the VTU identifying itself to a gateway or a centralized VTU management/control system to a VTU.

### 3.3.5 VTC Endpoint User Access Control

There are numerous DoD policy statements that require a user of a DoD IS to identify themselves to the IS so it can authenticate and authorize the user before being used or before service is provided. This is primarily so accesses to, and usage of, the IS and access to DoD information can be controlled and monitored based on the user's privileges or authorizations. These requirements range from a minimum of a user-id and password to token based two factor authentication and work in combination with security auditing to create a record of user activities that are tied to the user's identification.

VTC endpoints today do not provide any identification, authorization, or auditing capabilities with regard to their activation and use, whether stand alone or in conjunction with an authentication server. Any user can turn an endpoint on and make or receive calls. While at least one vendor's system can be configured to require the entry of a PIN to place a call, the feature is only a call accounting feature and not a security feature.

While gatekeepers and gateways provide some access control, this control only relates to access to their services. They do not play a part in endpoint activation or use of the endpoint for point-to-point calls.

The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) has developed H.235, which is the security recommendation for H.323 and other H.245 based systems. This recommendation provides for user identification rather than device identification. User identification can be simple or utilize Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). The latter being the goal of the DoD PKI policy. H.235 also has the capability and purpose of negotiating encryption and key exchange.

The ITU has also developed H.350. Unlike other H. series protocols, H.350 is a schema using Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) to store directory and identity management information. The use of H.350 can improve security by providing standardized management and storage of authentication credentials, as well as multilevel authorization.

The use of H.245 and H.350 in combination could be the solution to the endpoint activation and user identification deficiency currently exhibited by VTC endpoints.

While it seems debatable whether a VTC endpoint is, or should be, subject to DoD access control and auditing policies, particularly in unclassified environments, there are use cases where such compliance would be beneficial to the protection of DoD information. This is particularly in cases where a VTU is located in an area where classified materials, information, and/or discussions occur because an active VTU could generate a security incident. This issue could be more of a concern if the VTU was located in a classified work area while connected to an unclassified network or network having a lower classification than the work area. Compliance would also be beneficial for VTUs in areas processing sensitive information.

To protect the information discussed in the previous paragraph, the VTU should remain dormant (even while powered on) and not capable of placing or answering a call unless it is activated by a user logging onto the system.

### 3.3.6 Manual Password Management SOP

Those DoD policies and requirements that are not supported by the CODEC must be addressed and enforced by a site policy or SOP that provides compliance to the greatest extent possible within the capabilities of the system/device. Typically, a CODEC supports only one administrative password and therefore a group administrator account/password must be used. Some CODECs can support multiple user passwords or PINs for accounting purposes. Additionally, there are other passwords used to access certain features of the system and for the system and user to access other systems and devices.

### 3.3.7 One Time Use "Local Meeting Password"

A "local meeting password" must be used one time only. Once any meeting password is distributed to conferees, it is known by them. If a different and unique meeting password is not used for subsequent meetings, someone that has knowledge of (i.e., remembered or recorded) a previously used password could join a conference to which they were not invited to or in which they should not be included. This capability could violate requirements for access to information based on need-to-know and/or could lead to the disclosure of sensitive or classified information.

While the setting of the "local meeting password" password could be an administrator function, most often it is set by the VTU user hosting the conference since the integrated MCU may be used in an ad hoc manner. Ideally, its use would be prescheduled. As noted above, the capability that uses this password should not be functional at all times.

Of additional concern is: in the event a local meeting password is not set on the VTU, the VTU might provide no access control to the services that use it. This cannot be permitted if the VTU performs in this manner. As such this issue must be mitigated by configuration of a "blocking" password that is kept confidential.

In some instances, the local meeting password is also used for gaining access to media streamed from the VTU. While these are two different functions or entry points, and should not have the same password, the passwords for these functions are to be managed and used similarly. Streaming is discussed later in this document.

### 3.3.8 Configuration/Administration Session Timeout

An established and/or open configuration/administration (user or administrator) session that is inactive, idle, or unattended is an avenue for unauthorized access to the management port/interface of the VTU. This can lead to compromise of the system's/device's configuration and/or denial of service. Idle sessions can be caused simply by a user or administrator being distracted or diverted from a configuration/administration session/task or by forgetting to log out of the management session when finished with his/her tasks. To ensure the capability for unauthorized access in the event of an idle/inactive session is mitigated, an idle/inactive session timeout/logout capability must exist and be used. The timeout duration must be configurable to adjust for changing policies and requirements. Typically, this duration should be set for 15 minutes as a maximum; however, it can be shortened for tighter security. This requirement applies to all types of local and remote management connections/sessions and all management session protocols.

While not specifically related to VTC, this requirement can work against or inhibit certain management functions. System/device configuration backups or software upgrades requiring file transfers may exceed the idle timeout duration. In this case, the operation might fail if the idle timer disconnected the session midway through. During such events, the idle timer should recognize this activity as the session not being idle. Alternately, the idle timer duration may be extended or may be disabled as long as it is re-enabled/reset after the file transfer. Another management function that can be inhibited by an idle session timeout is when a session is required to be established for the continuous monitoring of the system/device. In this case, the idle timer may be disabled as long as it is re-enabled after the monitoring is no longer needed.

### **3.4 Media Streaming from a VTU/CODEC over IP**

Media Streaming as it is related to VTC systems permits a VTU to engage in a normal IP or ISDN connected conference with other VTUs while broadcasting (streaming) the conference audio and video to PC workstations over an IP based LAN to which it is connected. This permits a workstation user to view the conference in near real time but not to participate in it. VTUs may also stream other content such as pre-recorded media played from a VCR or similar media source and some VTUs support streaming while others do not. It seems that as vendors mature their streaming server technology and more products become available, they are removing the streaming capability from the CODEC where it presents greater vulnerability.

Streaming from a VTU's CODEC can also be used to record a conference by sending the stream to a recording/streaming server that can perform the recording function. These servers also serve as streaming distribution points. Recording/Streaming servers are discussed later.

While streaming from a CODEC most often uses IP multicast, streams can also be sent to one receiver (i.e., PC or recording/distribution server), or to multiple receivers in the local broadcast domain.

IP multicast or broadcast streaming works best within a LAN where ample bandwidth is available and IP multicast is supported. While multicast streaming is conceivable across a WAN such as the Internet, it is much less feasible and less reliable due to limited multicast support and access circuit bandwidth constraints. To use IP multicast, the network elements must be configured to support it.

To enable streaming, the following configuration items are needed:

- Destination address; unicast (address of specific destination, client or server); broadcast (local subnet or global); multicast (address configured on a router in the range 224.0.0.1-239.255.255.255)
- IP port(s) (some CODECs may require one port for audio and one for video)
- Time-To-Live (TTL) (i.e., number of router hops or routers to traverse)

VTU Streaming can typically be activated by a user selecting it from a menu. It could also be possible to activate it by the simple press of a button on the remote control. As such, it could be possible to activate streaming by accident when it is not desired or required. Additionally, some VTUs permit a remote user to activate the feature. The "broadcast" or stream is received by a

compatible client running on a PC. Examples of clients used are RealMedia Player™, Apple QuickTime™, VIC, or Cisco IP/TV.

To receive a multicast stream, the recipient can do one of the following two things:

- First, they can use a web browser to access the IP address of the CODEC that is streaming. The user accesses the CODEC's web page and clicks a link to receive the stream. This causes the browser to download an .sdp file (filename.sdp) that contains information about the stream and launch the streaming client. The .sdp file tells the client what IP address and port the stream can be found on, as well as the compression types (protocols) being used. Accessing the streaming web page or .sdp file typically requires the use of a password before gaining access. Some vendors use the administrator password (not acceptable) while others use a "meeting password". In some cases, the recipient (remote user) can also activate streaming (i.e., cause the CODEC to begin streaming) from this web page if it is not already activated.
- The second method of access is essentially direct. The recipient uses the streaming client to retrieve the .sdp file from the CODEC's IP address. Some streaming clients can access a multicast stream without the use of an .sdp file.

The only access control for streaming is that imposed by the CODEC for accessing its web page and/or retrieving the .sdp file. While this is effective using clients such as RealMedia Player™, Apple QuickTime™, which require the .sdp file information to function, there are other clients that do not. Using a client that does not, once the CODEC is streaming, anyone knowing the IP address and port for the stream can view the stream. There is no access control for viewing a media stream in this manner because IP provides no access control for joining an IP multicast group.

When streaming, there is no way of knowing who or how many recipients are viewing a conference. The number of possible recipients is virtually unlimited. Typically, there is only an indication on the VTU screen that the CODEC is streaming. Again, some VTUs permit streaming to be activated remotely by anybody who knows the IP address of the VTU and can access its streaming web page. As such, it could be possible for an unauthorized person to activate streaming and eavesdrop on the room or a conference in session. These vulnerabilities can greatly jeopardize the confidentiality of any given conference by broadcasting it on the connected LAN to indeterminate numbers of unknown recipients.

An additional vulnerability that streaming presents to any conference, whether hosted on a central MCU, point-to-point, or an MCU integrated unto a VTU is that any meeting participant could accidentally or maliciously stream the meeting from their VTU if their VTU supports streaming. For these reasons, the activation and use of streaming from a VTU/CODEC is discouraged and must be tightly controlled by all IAOs who are responsible for any streaming capable VTU that might participate in a conference. CODECs must be configured in such a way that if streaming is activated, the stream can only be accessed by authorized individuals or be non-functional or inaccessible if activated by accident.

### **3.4.1 Use of Streaming in General**

Generally speaking, the use of streaming to an IP multicast or broadcast address should never be used or activated unless it is required to fulfill a specific, validated, authorized, and documented mission requirement. This applies to both streaming from a CODEC or a recording/streaming server because of the inherent lack of full access control. Streaming to a unicast address, i.e., one recipient, from a CODEC should be the only method used. The one recipient should only be a recording/streaming server. The best method for streaming to a number of recipients is to use a recording/streaming/web server where media can be encrypted and DoD compliant access control and auditing can be enforced via individual viewer sessions with the server using protocols other than IP multicast or broadcast. In the event IP multicast must be used, the media stream must be encrypted and a secure key exchange process employed. Full DoD compliant access control and auditing is required to gain access to the .sdp file that contains the information required to decrypt the stream. Encryption will prevent a streaming client that does not require the .sdp file from viewing the content after accessing the stream.

While this requirement addresses some aspects for the use of recording/streaming servers, a more in depth discussion can be found later in this document.

### **3.4.2 Streaming Indicator**

It is imperative that the operator of a VTU know if his/her CODEC is streaming. This is due to the ease with which streaming can be activated accidentally or intentionally and that it can be activated remotely by various methods and individuals with different privilege levels. The VTU must display an indication on the screen if it is actively streaming so the VTU user/operator can be aware of the fact and take action to stop the streaming or disconnect the call if the CODEC should not be streaming.

### **3.4.3 SOP for CODEC Streaming**

To control streaming from a VTU/CODEC, the site must have a policy and procedure regarding the use of streaming. This could be very simple if streaming will never be used or more complex if there is the potential for its use. This SOP will reflect the requirements of this STIG regarding streaming.

### **3.4.4 User Training for CODEC Streaming**

In conjunction with the SOP for VTU/CODEC streaming, users must be trained in the vulnerabilities of streaming, how to recognize if their CODEC is streaming, and how to deactivate streaming if it should not be active.

### **3.4.5 Blocking Configuration for VTU/CODEC Streaming**

When a CODEC is not required to be streaming, the capability will be disabled. The preferred method for this is via an administrator configurable setting. Both user activation and remote start must be addressed. In lieu of this, a streaming configuration must be implemented on the VTU that inhibits the ability to stream such that streaming will not be able to effectively be used to view a room or conference.

### 3.4.6 VTU/CODEC Streaming Configuration

In the event conference streaming directly from a VTU/CODEC is approved for a given conference, the administrator will need to properly configure the VTU to support the streamed conference. One of these measures is to set a one-time-use password for the streamed media. Another measure is to install configuration settings to limit the reach of the streamed media across the network to only those portions that are to receive it. This is done by setting the TTL as low as possible. A mitigation that can be used for the lack of access control for IP multicast is to use different multicast addresses and IP ports each time a streaming session is configured. These should never be the default addresses or ports used by the vendor's system and they should be randomly selected.

Streaming is a feature of the VTU that could be turned on and configured for monitoring purposes by an adversary if the administrative access to the VTU is compromised. This is another reason why it is imperative to change all access codes and passwords on the VTU as required earlier. Additionally, users must be trained to recognize any displayed indication provided by the VTU that it is in streaming mode.

### 3.5 PC Data and Presentation Sharing

VTC CODECs provide various means and methods to permit the display of presentations and various other forms of data to all of the endpoints in a conference. Typically, this involves connecting a PC workstation, on which the presentation is displayed and controlled, to a CODEC which distributes the presentation to the conferees. Care in operating this feature must be exercised so the PC user does not inadvertently display information on their workstation that is not part of the conference and is not intended to be viewed by the conferees. Users must be aware that anything that they display on their PC workstation display while connected to the CODEC will be displayed on all of the conference monitors. This collaboration/display feature could result in the disclosure of sensitive or classified information to individuals that do not have a validated need-to-know or have the proper clearance to view the information. This is a problem when sharing a PC desktop via any collaboration tool using any connection method.

The first of the PC-CODEC interconnection methods, supported by most (but not all) CODECs, is the direct connection of the PC video output to an external video input on the CODEC. This method is the most common interconnection method, is most secure, and is the recommended method for DoD. This is the only method available to users of VTUs connected to ISDN only (i.e., not connected to an IP network in addition to the ISDN lines).

#### 3.5.1 PC Data and Presentation Sharing SOP

An SOP is needed that addresses mitigations for the vulnerabilities posed by PC data and presentation sharing. Such an SOP could include the following discussion. If a user needs to view non meeting related information while presenting to a conference, the PC external display port must be turned off, or better yet, the cable disconnected. Dual monitor operation of the PC could mitigate this problem somewhat. The second monitor output would be connected to the CODEC which would serve as the second monitor. Using this method, any information may be viewed on the native PC monitor while the presentation can be displayed on the VTU presentation screen.

### 3.5.2 PC Data and Presentation Sharing User Training

Users must be trained regarding the display of information that is not part of the conference. Such training must be based on the SOP discussed above that is designed to mitigate the vulnerability.

### 3.5.3 PC Data and Presentation Sharing Software

The second method for PC-CODEC interconnection for data/presentation sharing is to establish a virtual connection between the CODEC and PC workstation across an IP based LAN. While this method is implemented in different ways by different vendors, most if not all methods require the installation of an application or a utility on the PC workstation that is to share its data or display. While this method is convenient, since it does not require a cable connected to the CODEC, it presents varying degrees of vulnerability to the PC and the data it contains depending upon the particular application or utility installed. Additionally, the installation of such software is contrary to most DoD policy regarding approved workstation applications. All such software must be thoroughly evaluated and approved before installation.

Most vendors provide a proprietary application or utility that is loaded on the PC workstation to establish the virtual connection between the PC and CODEC. The main purpose and capability of this utility is to capture the PC's display graphics and send it to the CODEC. Typically, these utilities require only the IP address of the CODEC. The CODEC may or may not require a password to accept this input. When reading the documentation on these utilities there is no indication that the media stream generated by these utilities is encrypted. This may or may not be an issue depending upon the protocols used by the utility. Sniffing the stream may or may not reveal the displayed information. One vendor provides a utility to upload MS PowerPoint files to the CODEC and display them using an embedded viewer. This same vendor provides another utility to integrate with MS NetMeeting on the PC and stream content from there using T.120 protocol.

An additional feature of some of these utilities is the capability of conferees to share and work on files across the connection between CODECs. This feature brings a larger set of collaboration tool features to the VTC arena.

At least one vendor's virtual connection method requires the installation of PC remote control desktop sharing software on the PC. Once the remote control/access server application is running, anybody with the matching or compatible viewer/control application and the access password can connect to the PC workstation from another PC workstation. This provides full control of its resources and access to all of its files since this is the purpose of this type of application. This type of application can receive remote keyboard and mouse inputs as if the user was sitting at the PC itself controlling it. As such, this method is capable of much more than capturing the graphics displayed on the PC monitor and sending it to a CODEC. As such, an adversary could gain full control of the PC workstation at any time when the server application is running, whether there is a conference being displayed or not. Many such server applications are started as a service when the workstation is booted. This means that the connection is available to an adversary any time the PC is running. This is a huge vulnerability for the PC workstation. As such, the use of virtual connection methods must first be approved by the DAA and must be tightly controlled.



Another issue that must be addressed is the access control between the VTU and the PC. This discussion and/or requirements are dependent upon the direction of the access (i.e., PC to VTU or VTU to PC). Access to a PC (from a VTU), by policy, requires a strong policy compliant password (and other measures, supported or not). Such a password cannot be entered from a VTU remote control unless an on screen keyboard (or cell phone text entry requiring password display) is used thus opening the password to shoulder surfing or being viewed by a conference room full of people (discussed earlier). If the VTU is to initiate the connection to the PC, it is best to store a strong password on the VTU that will identify the VTU to the PC sharing application. The sharing application is only run when needed when the PC is required to interface with the VTU; it is not run as a service that is constantly available. Other constraints could apply. The recommended alternative is to initiate all VTU - PC connections from the PC and implementing the appropriate access control in the VTU in compliance with password policy if a virtual connection is to be used. Better yet, use a direct connection using a video out connection on the PC.

Furthermore, it is recommended that, if the remote control/access method is used, a PC workstation be dedicated to the purpose of displaying presentations on the CODEC. No other information should be placed on this PC. The PC should be turned off or disconnected from the LAN when a presentation is not being displayed to a conference. In this way, the installation of the remote control/access software will not place non-conference information at risk.

### **3.6 VTC Endpoint CODEC API Issues**

Large conference room VTC systems may be built into the conference room in such a way that a hand-held remote control cannot directly access or control the CODEC due to its being located in another room such as an AV control room. While there are systems and methods for extending the control signals from the hand-held remote control to the CODEC, many times the CODEC is connected to an AV control panel (typically called a "touch panel") that sits on the conference table or a podium. While this panel can be connected to the CODEC wirelessly (as discussed later) or via a wired IP connection, typically the connection is via an EIA-232 serial connection on the CODEC. To give the "touch panel" the ability to control the CODEC, the CODEC contains an Application Programmers Interface (API) control program. All functions that are available on the hand-held remote control are typically duplicated on the "touch panel".

#### **3.6.1 Password for API Configuration Administrative Command Access**

Typically, a VTC CODEC's API provides full access to all configuration settings and control commands supported by the CODEC. This can be a big problem if the command channel is compromised because this would give the attacker the ability to reconfigure the CODEC or its features and capabilities and not just control them. To mitigate this problem, the CODEC's API must provide a separation of the commands that control the system from the commands related to user and administrator configuration settings. If a password/PIN is implemented for user settings as required above, the touch panel must support the manual entry of the user configuration password/PIN assuming they will need to be accessed via the touch panel. Similarly, administrator settings should not be accessible from the touch panel or the interface on the CODEC that it uses without the use of an administrator password/PIN. Such separation/segregation of access to privileged commands is required by DoDI 8500.2 IA controls ECLP-1 and ECPA-1.

### **3.6.2 API Command Encryption and Authentication**

The commands passed between the "touch panel" and CODEC are typically in a human readable clear text format. While older touch panels required a physical and direct connection to the EIA-232 serial connection on the CODEC, newer models are being developed to make use of Ethernet networks and associated IP protocols. Wireless models are also becoming available using wireless networking technologies. Sending clear text commands across these types of connections is an issue because it places the CODEC at risk of hijack, i.e., being controlled by an entity other than the authorized touch panel in the conference room. Due to these issues, if the touch panel is implemented using a networking technology, the API commands must be encrypted in transit and the CODEC must authenticate the source of the commands.

### **3.7 Remote Management/Configuration IP Protocol Concerns**

The following addresses the various IP protocols used for remote management or configuration and operation of a VTU.

#### **3.7.1 Use Secure Management Protocols**

Many VTC Endpoints are remotely accessed across a LAN via non-secure IP protocols, such as telnet, FTP, and HTTP. This poses another confidentiality issue since these protocols do not meet DoD requirements for password encryption while in transit per DoDI 8500.2 IA control IAIA-1 and IAIA-2, nor do they meet the encryption requirements for sensitive information in transit as required by IA controls ECCT-1 and ECNK-1. Therefore, if possible, non-secure protocols should not be used. Some devices provide the option to select the secure versions of these protocols, such as HTTPS, FTPS, and SSH for remote access. Secure protocols are required over non-secure protocols if available.

Of additional concern is that remote control/management/configuration is performed in-band. In other words, it is performed using the same Ethernet port as the VTC traffic utilizes. If non-secure protocols must be utilized, the VTC production and CODEC remote access traffic must be segregated on the LAN from the normal data traffic. This is so the confidentiality of the remote access password and sensitive management/configuration information is protected to the greatest extent possible by limiting access to it. Segregation requirements are discussed later under the LAN configuration section.

#### **3.7.2 Disable Unnecessary Protocols**

Management protocols, secure or not, that are not required or used for management of a device in a given implementation, but are active and available for a connection, places the device at risk of compromise and unauthorized access. These protocols must be disabled or turned off.

#### **3.7.3 SNMP Requirements**

Some VTC endpoints can be monitored using SNMP. It is also possible that if not today, in the future, VTC endpoints could be configured via SNMP. SNMP is typically used by vendor's VTU/MCU management applications but it is conceivable that SNMP traps could be sent to any

SNMP compatible network management system. At the time of this writing, applicable STIG requirements for the use of SNMP are contained in the Network Infrastructure STIG.

### **3.7.4 Management/Configuration IP addresses**

In any network device management system, it is best practice to limit the IP address or addresses from which a network attached device can be accessed and to which device status information can be sent.

## **3.8 VTC Endpoint Firmware/Software Version RE: Password Compromise**

Some of today's VTUs do not appropriately protect their passwords or access codes. Best practice and DoD policy dictates that authenticators are to be protected. This includes user account names, passwords, PINs, access codes, etc. The primary method used to protect these bits of information is encryption in transit for both the username and the password, and encryption of passwords in storage. It has been found that some VTC endpoint vendors do not provide this protection for passwords in storage, or at least, have not in the past.

The first such vulnerability to be aware of is one where the administrator password can be obtained across the network by requesting certain files from the CODEC using a web browser. Once the file is accessed, the admin password is displayed in the clear within the source code for the page.

The second such vulnerability to be aware of is one where, in one vendor's product line, the user access codes are stored in a clear text file that is uploaded to the CODEC. This file is accessible from the FTP server on the CODEC. Access is, however, protected by the remote access password. One can only assume the vendor does not value these access codes as an IA measure since the discussion of their use relates to call accounting.

### **3.8.1 Use Latest Firmware, Software, and Patches**

Vulnerabilities are typically addressed by vendors via patches to software, firmware upgrades, and major new releases of code. It is recommended that all patches, firmware, and software updates applied to DoD VTC systems be digitally signed by the vendor to ensure its authenticity and integrity. A vendor may provide security updates and patches that offer additional desired functions. In many cases, the IA vulnerability management (IAVM) system mandates updating software to reduce risk to DoD networks.

## **3.9 DoD System Use Notification Message**

A DoD approved system use notification messages must be displayed when individuals log in to any information system, including VTC systems and endpoints. The approved DoD text must be used as specified in the DoD Instruction 8500.01 dated March 14, 2014.

DoDI 8500.2 IA control ECWM-1 regarding "Warning Message" requires "users" to be warned that "they are entering a Government information system, and are provided with appropriate privacy and security notices to include statements informing them that they are subject to monitoring, recording and auditing." This requirement applies to all user and administrative access points or interfaces to a DoD Information System.

The purpose of the logon warning or "Notice and Consent Banner" is two-fold. First, it warns users that unless they are authorized they should not proceed. It is like an electronic "No Trespassing" sign that allows prosecution of those who do trespass. Secondly, it warns both authorized and unauthorized users that they are subject to monitoring to detect unauthorized use and access if they do logon or attempt to logon. This provides the informed consent that again allows prosecution of those who abuse or damage the system. Not displaying the properly worded banner will hamper the sites legal authority or ability to monitor the given device. Failure to display the required login banner prior to logon attempts will also limit the sites ability to prosecute unauthorized access which has the potential of criminal and civil liability for systems administrators and information systems managers who fail to cause the banner to be displayed. Banner requirements are applicable to any and all DoD information systems, and more specifically those requiring a logon for access.

All user and administrator access requires a logon per DoD policy. Acknowledgment of the banner with a keystroke or mouse click before receiving the logon screen is the preferred display and acknowledgment method which can be supported on most, if not all, user and management terminals/workstations and many managed systems/devices. Unfortunately, some managed systems/devices cannot support this due to limitations in memory and/or processing power. In this case, the banner must minimally be displayed on the logon screen. Continuing to login implies acknowledgement and consent based upon the login being the acknowledgement keystroke.

In order for VTC systems and devices to properly comply with the warning banner requirement, the banner must be displayed and acknowledged in the following situations:

When a normal user or administrator logs in to or activates the VTU locally, i.e., when the VTU is initially powered on and when it comes out of sleep mode (selectable) in the event sleep mode is used instead of powering off the VTU.

- When an administrator remotely accesses/logs in to a VTU or any other VTC system device (i.e., MCU, gateway, any server) over any network connection whatever the purpose, access method, application, or protocol used.
- When an administrator accesses/logs in to a management suite/application and/or its supporting platform(s).
- When a user is required to logon to a multipoint conference via an MCU.
- When a user accesses/logs in to an independent scheduling system, i.e., a standalone scheduling application hosted on a server or appliance (i.e., application or web server). This would not be required if the scheduling process was performed through another application that the user was running on their platform, such as a collaboration or unified communications tool/application to which they had already logged in.
- When a user accesses/logs-in to a streamed conference whatever the source, i.e., VTU or streaming media server.

Regarding the inclusion of the MCU in the above list: it is debatable whether an MCU (centralized or VTU integrated) needs to comply with this requirement. While the MCU and VTU-MCU are DoD ISSs, the argument can be made that a user accessing the MCU should have

already logged into a VTU, which is the endpoint of the VTC system (viewing and acknowledging the banner). This argument works if the VTU and MCU are part of the same organization or integrated system. However, the argument does not work if the MCU is, or can be, accessed by someone from a different organization than the one that operates the MCU and more so if the person accessing the MCU is a non-DoD entity. Therefore, the access control mechanism for the MCU must present the user with the banner and require its acknowledgement. In some cases, this function could be handled by a device external to the MCU (if used) that authenticates the user and controls access to the MCU.

VTC endpoints (and MCUs) typically do not support this requirement (that is, at the time of this writing). No "warning banner/message" is displayed on configuration interfaces or to a user. Some VTUs provide a capability that permits the use of a customized company logo in place of the vendor's logo on the welcome or possibly some other screen. This is implemented by uploading a graphics image file, such as a .jpg to the VTU. This feature can and should be used, in lieu of a better method, to install a warning banner that is shown to the user on initial startup of the VTU and while it is not participating in a conference. This feature could provide partial and minimal compliance with the DoD banner requirement, but only for VTU users and administrators using the local access method with the remote control.

A suggested process for this non-compliance mitigation follows: banner text can be written and formatted in a text editor as appropriate to fit the display parameters of the CODEC for its logo display. This formatted text can be converted to .jpg or other compatible graphics file using a screen capture program such as PrintKey v3.0. Experimentation may be necessary to get the banner to display cleanly in a readable size. VTC administrators who successfully implement a banner in this manner are encouraged to send their file to the FSO helpdesk [disa.letterkenny.FSO.mbx.stig-customer-support-mailbox@mail.mil](mailto:disa.letterkenny.FSO.mbx.stig-customer-support-mailbox@mail.mil) along with the make and model of the VTU on which it was installed so it may be shared with others.

While the mitigation suggested above is a partial solution, it does not solve the problem and vendors need to build this functionality into their products that are sold to the DoD to meet DoD policy.

It is understood that this requirement will generate a finding for most, if not all, VTC devices in use or available today. Vendors are encouraged to provide the required functionality to meet this requirement in future products, not only for their DoD customers but also for other Federal Government customers that most likely need to comply with NIST SP 800-53 AC-8. Vendors are also encouraged to produce patches or firmware/software upgrades to add this functionality to products that are already deployed and in use throughout the DoD and Federal Government today.

### **3.10 VTC Infrastructure and Management Appliances/Applications**

Most VTC system vendors offer a range of centralized VTC system management applications and application suites. These include VTC endpoint and MCU managers, gatekeeper, gateway, and scheduling software. Gateways, gatekeepers, and scheduling systems are discussed later in this document.

The advantage of implementing a management system for the management of VTC endpoints is that all endpoints can be managed from a central location and their configuration can be standardized. This is a good thing in that configuration changes made on any given endpoint for temporary purposes can be discovered and corrected easily.

The disadvantage is that their use makes all managed VTC endpoints vulnerable and at risk of compromise if the management system is compromised.

While compliance with all applicable STIGs is covered in the next subsection, additional guidance may be provided in a future release of this or a related document.

### **3.10.1 Compliance with all applicable STIGs**

Typically, VTC vendors provide their management applications and other infrastructure products on appliances with embedded operating systems (modified/scaled down, general purpose, or proprietary) and other application and database code (proprietary or otherwise). Some of these applications may be provided to run on a general purpose platform.

In general, to mitigate risks, all VTC system management applications and application suites, including endpoint and MCU managers, gateways, gatekeepers, and scheduling systems, must be operated on secure or hardened platforms and comply with all applicable DoD STIGs with specific emphasis on user accounts, roles/permissions, access control, and auditing.

The following is a listing of, but possibly not all, applicable STIGs:

- Operating system, i.e., Windows, UNIX
- Web Server, Application Services
- Database
- Application Development, Application Security Checklist

### **3.11 VTC Recording, Archiving, and Streaming Devices**

Some VTC system vendors offer network appliances or servers that can be used to record and archive meetings. These typically can also be used as distribution or streaming servers.

In general, the following IA measures must be considered and applied when assessing and implementing such a device:

- The application must be operated on a secure or hardened platform and comply with all applicable DoD STIGs.
- Role and permissions based access control and auditing at the user level, as well as the administrator level.
- User Authentication, Authorization, and Accountability (AAA) must be exercised to control who can initiate a recording of a meeting, and who can stream a meeting. This could be done on-board or by leveraging an AAA server.
- Ownership of meeting recordings, i.e., who controls the access rights to view, allow others to view, and dispose (move, copy, delete, or archive to removable media) of the meeting. This would seem to be the organization or person that recorded it. Administrators might not have the right to view meetings for reasons of meeting

confidentiality and need-to-know, but may have the right to dispose of it to maintain the health of the server/appliance.

- Confidentiality of meetings and other media housed on the device, i.e., encrypted storage for data at rest.
- Confidentiality of meetings and other media while it is being recorded or streamed across the network to/from a user, i.e., encryption for data in transit (i.e., IPSEC, TLS).
- The use of such a device on classified networks along with the classification level of the meetings recorded and streamed. The classification level of the device and the highest classification of the information it processes or stores must be derived from the classification level of the network to which it is attached. Additionally, the device must be located in an area that is rated for the derived classification level.
- Classification of meeting recordings, i.e., defines a classification guide and who has the ability to determine the classification of a meeting recording and who has associated responsibility for safeguarding and declassification or classification downgrade.
- Announcement and recording of the classification level of the recording, i.e., the "owner" or organizer/moderator of the conference/meeting should be required to, at the beginning of the recording session, announce the classification level of the meeting.
- Announcement that the meeting is being recorded, i.e., the "owner" or organizer/moderator of the conference/meeting should be required to announce the fact that the meeting is being recorded to the participants.

It is unknown at this time if these types of devices can support the considerations noted above. Vendors are encouraged to provide features that can.

Further guidance and requirements will be provided in a future release of this or a similar document.

### **3.12 PC Workstations as VTC Endpoints: Requirements**

As noted above under the VTC endpoint definitions, a PC workstation can function as a VTC endpoint using a software application. In general, these applications must be operated on secure or hardened platforms that comply with all applicable DoD STIGs in addition to the applicable requirements contained in this STIG. The platform provides the access control required to operate the VTU. The application may be required to provide certain additional IA features while the supporting network may need to meet additional architectural and IA requirements. Specific guidance will be provided in a future release of a related document covering PC workstation communications soft clients, i.e., softphones, soft-VTUs, and collaboration clients.

#### **4. POLICIES, DOCUMENTATION, APPROVALS, SOPS, USER AGREEMENTS, AND TRAINING**

Due to the IA implications of using a VTC endpoint, there must be policies, SOPs, user agreements, recurring user training, and DAA approvals or acceptance of risk for their use. This section will discuss these items.

##### **4.1 VTC Endpoint Office Installation Policy**

Due to the various IA issues surrounding VTC endpoint operation, they should only be installed or deployed where there is a validated requirement for their use. Conference room systems are easily justified and beneficial to an organization. General deployment to every desk in an organization is more difficult to justify. Deployments of office based VTUs, desktop VTUs, and PC software based VTC applications must be considered on the basis of a validated need for the user to have this capability.

In general, when VTC systems are implemented, consideration must be given to mission benefit weighed against the operational risks and the possibility of improper disclosure of information as discussed throughout this document. While this is important for ISDN only connected VTUs, this is most important for IP connected VTUs.

The site must develop policies and enforce them regarding the deployment of VTC endpoints in support of IA control DCSD-1, which requires IA documentation be maintained, and IA control DCPR-1, which requires a change management process be instituted.

##### **4.2 DAA Approval for VTC Implementation**

DoDI 8500.2 IA control DCII-1 regarding "Security Design and Configuration/IA Impact Assessment" states "Changes to the DoD information system are assessed for IA and accreditation impact prior to implementation."

IA control DCII-1 essentially requires that the risk of operating any DoD system or application be assessed, defined, and formally accepted before use. The person responsible for the enclave's network and system's or application's accreditation is the DAA. The DAA is also "the official with the authority to formally assume responsibility for operating a system at an acceptable level of risk" per the definition of the DAA in DoDD 8500.1.

For the above reasons, the DAA must approve changes to an existing system or the implementation of a new system or application that can affect the IA posture and therefore the accreditation of the system(s) for which he/she is responsible.

The IA issues surrounding the use of VTC endpoints warrant DAA approval. The DAA responsible for the network supporting a VTC endpoint and area in which it is installed must be made aware of the issues and vulnerabilities presented to the network, the area, and information processed, as well as the mitigations for same. Once informed, the DAA can approve the operation with "an acceptable level of risk", if so inclined. Approval by the DAA responsible for the locally effected enclave/network/area must be obtained in addition to accreditation received from the DISN DAAs represented by the DISN Security Accreditation Working Group



(DSAWG) through the DoD APL or other pre-deployment approval process, such as the Information Support Plan (ISP) or Tailored Information Support Plan (T-ISP) process.

The DAA approval required here is for the addition of IP based VTC endpoints or VTC infrastructure devices (MCUs, gatekeepers, gateways, etc.) to the base network and/or organization's intranet. This is not intended to require separate approval for each individual endpoint in a multi-endpoint system; however, if the system is a single endpoint, it may require an individual approval.

Appropriate documentation is added to the Site Security Authorization Agreement (SSAA) or other documentation that exists for the accreditation of the supporting network and the accreditation is adjusted accordingly. Standalone VTC systems or endpoints, such as those that connect using ISDN only may have their own accreditation or may be added to the site accreditation.

### **4.3 Local VTC endpoint Implementation, Operation, and Use Policy - SOPs**

Implementation, operation, and use policies for VTC endpoints have been discussed throughout this document and have been the subject of several requirements. These SOPs are required to mitigate IA deficiencies in the VTC equipment and/or mitigate the vulnerabilities that their use presents to the environment in which they are installed and to the information they process or communicate, whether intentionally or inadvertently.

In the interest of time, they will not be repeated here. Further guidance and requirements or a restructuring of the stated requirements may be provided in a future release of this or a similar document.

### **4.4 VTC Endpoint User/Administrator Training**

DoDI 8500.2 IA control PRTN-1 regarding "Personnel/Information Assurance Training" states "A program is implemented to ensure that upon arrival and periodically thereafter, all personnel receive training and familiarization to perform their assigned IA responsibilities, to include familiarization with their prescribed roles in all IA- related plans, such as incident response, configuration management and COOP or disaster recovery."

An "assigned IA responsibility" of any user or administrator of a DoD IS is to operate the system or device in a secure and IA conscious or aware manner. This means that administrators have an "assigned IA responsibility" to configure systems and devices in a manner that mitigates vulnerabilities and other IA issues to the greatest extent possible. This also means that users have an "assigned IA responsibility" to use and operate systems and devices in the same manner.

Under this IA control, users and administrators of VTC systems and endpoints must receive training that covers the vulnerabilities and other IA issues associated with operating a VTC system and/or endpoint. Additionally, users and administrators must be trained in the proper configuration, installation techniques, and approved connections for the VTC system and/or endpoint that are applicable to their exposure to the system. Furthermore, users and administrators must be trained in the proper operating procedures for the system so meeting information is properly protected, as well as, other non-meeting related information in the area

near a VTC endpoint is not improperly disclosed or compromised. Helpdesk representatives supporting a VTC system or endpoints must also be appropriately trained in all aspects of VTC operation and IA. This may be accomplished within a typical tiered helpdesk organization, but all representatives must be made aware of the IA vulnerabilities and issues.

#### **4.5 VTC Endpoint User's Agreement and Training Acknowledgment**

DoDI 8500.2 IA control PRRB-1 regarding "Security Rules of Behavior or Acceptable Use Policy" states "A set of rules that describe the IA operations of the DoD information system and clearly delineate IA responsibilities and expected behavior of all personnel is in place. The rules include the consequences of inconsistent behavior or non-compliance. Signed acknowledgement of the rules is a condition of access."

This IA control requires, or at minimum supports, the generation and use of a "user agreement" that contains site policy regarding acceptable use of various IS assets. Requiring the user to read and sign the user agreement before receiving their government furnished hardware and/or software, or before gaining access to an additional IS or add on application or an additional privilege, provides the required acknowledgement.

The Secure Remote Computing STIG requires a user agreement be used and signed for a user to be permitted to remotely access a DoD network or system. The Wireless STIG adds policy items to this user agreement regarding the use of wireless capabilities in conjunction with remote access. While the first two STIGs mentioned require a user agreement prior to remote access privileges being granted, there should also be a user agreement signed when the user receives any government furnished hardware that covers all acceptable use policies to include such things as acceptable web browsing, remote access, all wireless usage, as well as the usage of certain applications and personal hardware and software.

This STIG defines most, but not necessarily all, of the rules of use and operational procedures for VTC endpoints of all types. Each endpoint type will or may require different rules and procedures. Users must be informed of the vulnerabilities and risks of VTC endpoint use and trained in the procedures required to mitigate them as described in the training requirement. Furthermore, users must acknowledge their awareness of the IA issues and mitigating requirements and their agreement to abide by the rules of operation of the VTC endpoint or system. This is accomplished by the user signing a "user agreement". This user agreement should restate the high points of the required training and might serve as an acknowledgement that the training was received. This user agreement can also include a statement of the penalties for non-compliance with the rules of operation.

#### **4.6 VTC Endpoint User's Guide**

User's documentation packages should include user's agreements, training documentation, and endpoint user's guides that reiterate the training information and the agreed upon User's Agreement policies. The Endpoint User's Guides should also provide additional information to include system or device operations, usage procedures for features, and IA measures, as required, to address the protection of both meeting related and non-meeting related information.

This requirement is supported by DoDI 8500.2 IA control PRRB-1 discussed above.

## 5. LOCAL NETWORK SECURITY FOR VTC

This section will discuss various IA issues regarding the connection of one or more VTC endpoints to a LAN.

### 5.1 LAN Service Segregation

A common and widely used practice in traditional LAN design is the use and implementation of VLANs (at layer 2) and IP subnets (at layer 3) to segregate services and organizational workgroups or departments including their traffic as it traverses the LAN. This has the effect of providing confidentiality for the workgroup traffic by limiting the ability of users in other workgroups to see and access the traffic. It also enhances the ability to control traffic flows for, and access to, LAN services. Another benefit of using VLANs is that it can improve network performance if they are properly pruned. Typically, when a VLAN is configured on one LAN switch, the other switches in the network will "learn" that VLAN, thus it will propagate throughout the network. This property is not what enhances network performance since it allows broadcast traffic in the VLAN to traverse the entire network. Also, if the number of allowable VLANs that a switch has configured or learns is exceeded, the LAN can become unstable. VLAN pruning eliminates this problem and is actually what can enhance network performance by limiting the traffic that devices in the LAN must process.

This practice is very useful in protecting a communications service running on the LAN. The use of a separate IP address space and separate VLANs for VoIP telephone systems (different than those assigned to data services) is required by the VoIP STIG. This requirement helps protect the voice communication service from compromise and will provide the same protection for VTC services running on the LAN.

The use of a separate IP address space and properly pruned separate VLANs for VTC systems will have the following effects:

- Enhance the confidentiality of unencrypted VTC traffic.
- Enhance the confidentiality of the VTC device management traffic particularly if secure protocols are not available for use.
- Limit the ability of the average LAN user (in the data VLAN(s)) to "see" the VTC device(s) on the LAN (in the VTC VLAN(s)) thereby limiting the possibility of compromise from user or machine induced malicious activity (in data VLAN(s)).

This separation is intended to protect the VTC devices and the information conveyed by them from compromise. It is not intended to prevent a PC soft VTC client (in the data VLAN(s)) from participating in a conference or from viewing a streamed conference. This can be implemented through appropriate routing and gateways. PC based soft-VTUs and their segregation is covered in a related document covering softphones and soft-VTUs.

Different VTC systems should be protected using different VLAN structures as follows:

- Primary conference room systems should have their own closely pruned VLAN and IP subnet. This could be a single conference room, or several conference rooms, if they are required to communicate with each other or are part of an overall managed VTC network within the enclave. This will provide the maximum protection from compromise for the conference room systems.
- Hardware based desktop and office VTUs should be grouped into their own VLAN and IP subnet. This could be the same VLAN and subnet as the one used for conference rooms if these devices are to communicate with them or if they are part of an overall managed VTC network within the enclave.
- Hardware based desktop and office VTUs that integrate and signal with the site's VoIP telephone system may be grouped separately or utilize the Voice system VLAN structure and IP subnet.
- PC based soft-VTUs are to be implemented or segregated/controlled as described in the related document covering softphones and soft-VTUs.
- Local MCUs and VTU management stations must reside in the VTC VLAN and IP subnet with the devices they manage or conference.
- If WAN access is required, the VLAN(s) can be extended to the enclave boundary.

Another concern when implementing VLANs on a LAN is the default functionality of routers to create paths or routes between IP address that they can reach or are aware of. While it requires a routing device (router or a layer three switch) to communicate between VLANs, a router will, by default, create a route between the IP addresses in the different VLANs it "sees". This behavior works against the separation and protection provided by a segregated VLAN and IP subnet structure. To maintain the integrity of this structure, router ACLs must be configured on routing devices that block this default behavior. VTU Traffic is then only permitted to cross VLAN boundaries where required and at the points in the LAN where required.

VLAN Pruning must limit the reach of the VLAN(s) to only those network elements and links required to interconnect the devices in the VLAN.

This requirement is supported by DoDI 8500.2 IA control DCSP-1 regarding Security Design and Configuration/Security Support Structure Partitioning which states "The security support structure is isolated by means of partitions, domains, etc., including control of access to, and integrity of, hardware, software, and firmware that perform security functions. The security support structure maintains separate execution domains (i.e., address spaces) for each executing process."

It is recognized that in some tactical environments or programs this requirement may not be able to be met due to various constraints. In this case, the situation must be documented and the responsible DAA must accept the risk for not meeting the requirement.

It is recommended that VTUs that integrate VoIP telephone systems be implemented so they work with the RTS Assured Service communications infrastructure being developed.

Further guidance and requirements on the segregation of VTC systems on the LAN may be provided in a future release of this or a related document. The guidance provided here will minimally be coordinated or combined with similar guidance found in the VVoIP STIG.

### **5.1.1 Wireless LAN Access**

Some VTC endpoints provide integrated support for wireless LAN connectivity. This is typically supported by the inclusion of a Personal Computer Memory Card International Association (PCMCIA) slot and wireless LAN configuration settings that supports a third party PCMCIA wireless LAN card. This capability may also provide both ad hoc and access point/infrastructure connections. Other vendors claim wireless support via the LAN port. This requires an external wireless LAN adapter which is externally configured. While these wireless LAN capabilities exist today, it is also possible that a wireless adapter could be incorporated into the CODEC much as they are in laptops today.

#### **5.1.1.1 Wireless STIG Compliance**

In the event wireless LAN connectivity is to be used for VTC endpoints, it must be implemented via an established and approved wireless LAN infrastructure which is configured, along with its connected devices, in compliance with the Wireless STIG. Key requirements include Wi-Fi and WPA2 certification of the VTC wireless LAN Network Interface Card (NIC) and FIPS 140-2 certification of the wireless encryption module.

#### **5.1.1.2 Simultaneous Wired and Wireless LAN Connection**

An additional consideration regarding wireless LAN capabilities in VTC endpoints is the possibility that, with some implementations, a VTU could be connected to a wired LAN while also supporting a wireless connection in either ad hoc or infrastructure mode. Activating wireless capabilities on a VTU while it is connected to a wired LAN can provide an attack vector to that LAN. If the VTU connects via infrastructure mode to a non-DoD WLAN in the vicinity of the VTU, a bridge could be formed between the 2 LANs compromising the DoD wired LAN, as well as any conference sessions in which the VTU is included. If connected via an ad hoc connection, the same vulnerabilities exist for the conference since the other connected device may or may not be connected to another LAN. Either way, this has the potential of creating a back door to the DoD wired LAN, a vulnerability which must be mitigated by preventing this dual connectivity. The Wireless STIG describes security requirements for both ad hoc and infrastructure mode wireless connections.

#### **5.1.1.3 Disable Wireless Support**

The proper mitigation for the vulnerabilities discussed above is to disable the wireless capability available or included in a VTC endpoint. Typically, one would expect a configuration setting that says something like "Disable Wireless" that would disable any onboard wireless capability whether integrated or reliant on a plug-in card. The Wireless STIG in WIR0167 requires all wireless LAN NICs to be turned-off by default after system boot-up or whenever a wireless network connection is not required. Additionally, WIR0130 requires that the NIC have the capability to disable ad hoc connectivity. While these requirements are addressed toward PCs and PEDs, they are applicable to VTC endpoints. Support for these requirements does not seem to be available with at least some VTC endpoint's PCMCIA wireless LAN card

implementations. It is conceivable that a WLAN card could be inserted into the PCMCIA slot and activated with basic default settings and no security. To prevent this, the VTU's PCMCIA slot must be physically blocked, making it difficult to insert a WLAN card.

#### **5.1.1.4 Wireless Conference Room Implementation**

Conference room VTC systems, and particularly large ones, can require multiple microphones, cameras, and displays along with AV control systems. These systems typically require a significant amount of wiring. This can be a problem when retrofitting a well appointed conference room without damaging the room's walls, ceilings, furniture, and finishes. As a result, conference room VTC systems, as well as other VTC endpoint systems, can utilize various wireless communication technologies to interconnect its microphones, cameras, speakers, desktop audio conferencing units, and displays to the VTC CODEC and control panels to the AV control system and CODEC. The wireless communications technologies used are 802.11, Bluetooth, standard radio (cordless telephone and wireless microphone frequencies/technology), as well as infrared.

The use of wireless technologies to implement a conference room in a DoD facility could pose an eavesdropping vulnerability to VTC conferences and other meetings held in the facility. This could place sensitive or classified DoD information at risk. To mitigate this, all audio, video, white boarding, and data sharing communications within the conference room system must be encrypted. Furthermore, those technologies covered by the Wireless STIG and other DoD wireless policies, must be in compliance with them.

A much more expensive mitigation to this issue would be to enclose the room in RF shielding so the information carrying VTC radio signals do not escape the facility. This might not be practical.

Wireless AV control systems or "touch panels" were discussed and requirements provided earlier in this document. These requirements are to be used in conjunction with this one.

#### **5.1.2 Endpoint Authentication to the LAN/Port Security**

The Network Infrastructure STIG requires that access control for devices connecting to the LAN is implemented. This is called port security. It provides for various means of doing this, one of which is the use of 802.1x authentication of network attached devices. Some VTC endpoints support 802.1x which must be configured on the VTU along with the appropriate challenge type if the LAN uses this method of port security. Other methods are handled by the LAN access switch.

Port security and the implementation of 802.1x are performed in accordance with the Network Infrastructure STIG. Other endpoint authentication information and requirements are covered elsewhere in this document.

## 6. IP BASED VTC ENCLAVE BOUNDARY CROSSING ISSUES

VTC over IP like voice over IP is a real time communications media or RTS which uses signaling protocols to set up and tear down calls and additional protocols to carry and control the media streams. Signaling protocols typically use Transport Control Protocol (TCP) while the media streams use User Datagram Protocol (UDP).

Typical firewall rule sets permit outgoing requests and only inbound responses to them. While this may work for outgoing RTS calls, incoming calls are blocked. This means that for incoming calls to be set up, the IP port or ports used for signaling must be open for inbound requests. Furthermore, if it is unknown from where in the world an inbound call will be received (calls can be received from customers, suppliers, and telecommuters), this port must permit the IP port or ports sourced from all IP addresses. Additionally, the IP ports used for the media streams are typically selected randomly or dynamically, in sets of four per media stream, across the entire range of non-well-known IP ports (i.e., 1024 through 65535). Some vendors limit this to a much smaller range. To receive the media streams, this wide range of IP ports must also be permitted inbound from the wide range of IP addresses.

Additional standard and non-standard ports are used by VTC vendors for management and access control. Most of these are listed in Table 6-2.

The wide range of UDP ports and the select TCP ports needing to be opened bidirectionally destroys traditional network enclave boundary protection. This presents a huge vulnerability to the protection of the network enclave.

### 6.1 Network Address Translation (NAT)

The Network Infrastructure STIG NET0190 requires that real addresses of devices within the enclave not be revealed outside the enclave by implementing NAT on the firewall or the router at the enclave boundary or by using a proxy.

The typical method for meeting this requirement is to use a "private" addressing scheme, in accordance with IETF RFC 1918, within the enclave along with NAT or a proxy at the enclave boundary. NAT, however, does not require the use of "private", RFC 1918, addresses. In fact, the use of RFC 1918 addresses on SIPRNet is contrary to guidance from the SIPRNet PMO for reasons of accountability. Even so, NET0190 still applies.

RTS devices must therefore accept the addressing scheme provided by the network that supports them, "public" or "private" along with NAT if used.

Using NAT, outgoing and incoming packets are modified as they pass through the NAT device. The internal addresses are replaced by the external address in source field of the packet headers on their way out and conversely on the way back in.

This is a problem for RTS communications protocols which are designed to negotiate call setup and media stream addressing directly between endpoints. To effectively communicate, each endpoint needs to know the unique address of the other endpoint. NAT typically replaces the

unique address with one common one. This confuses the system with regard to the incoming packets since it does not know what internal endpoint the packet is destined for. The call cannot be completed.

Basic NAT on a router or firewall breaks RTS communications using SIP and H.323 signaling protocols, however, there are methods to deal with the problem. These are discussed below.

If NAT is used by an enclave to hide its internal infrastructure and devices in accordance with NET0190, and if VTC is to traverse the enclave boundary, the VTC endpoints and infrastructure components will use the internal addresses and NAT at the enclave boundary.

## 6.2 VTC Capable Firewall

To mitigate the issues discussed in the previous sections, a specialized firewall is required that is application aware (i.e., it understands the secondary IP port negotiations between endpoints within the signaling messages) and can open ports (i.e., create pinholes) for the signaling and media streams dynamically for the duration of the call. Meanwhile, the firewall must ensure the packets permitted to pass through the pinhole are actually part of the given communications session. Additional functionality of such a firewall is to deal with the NAT problem and provide NAT services for the RTS traffic. This is typically handled through a proxy function. Such a firewall is called an Application Layer Gateway (ALG)/ Stateful Packet Inspection Firewall. This can be implemented in parallel with a standard traditional non RTS aware data firewall or as part of a single firewall solution. These firewalls are relatively new to the marketplace. Major vendors now offer these, as well as some VTC and VoIP system vendors.

While a RTS capable/aware eliminates the need for opening large numbers of UDP ports on a standard firewall, thereby negating its effectiveness, a few ports must still be opened (or permitted inbound) to receive incoming calls. The ports that must be permitted inbound are the primary signaling ports. For H.323 VTC, this is primarily or minimally port 1720. This being the case, this opening must be restricted by IP address. A firewall administrator must therefore know the IP addresses or range of addresses of the VTUs or VTC systems that are expected to call.

The implementation of a properly configured RTS capable/aware Application Layer Gateway / Stateful Packet Inspection Firewall as described above meets DoD boundary protection requirements for V/VoIP (RTS) systems whose traffic must traverse a DISN WAN. Such a device must be used or an approved firewall traversal solution as discussed below.

A firewall performs an IA function as its primary purpose (i.e., protecting the LAN and internal connected devices from unwanted access and compromise). It is therefore subject to NIAP Common Criteria Validation in accordance with DoDI 8500.2 IA control DCAS-1 and NSTISSP No. 11.

The firewall function discussed here is essentially the same as is discussed in the VoIP STIG and is what is needed for all RTS traffic. Additional information and specific requirements for firewalls will be addressed in a future release of this or a similar/associated document.



### 6.3 H.323 Firewall Traversal Technologies

VTC system vendors and integrators have used various methods or "work arounds" to solve the problems that traditional firewalls and NAT present to V/VoIP traffic. These methods are in lieu of employing the recently available RTS ALG solution as discussed above.

One of these is to use an IP to ISDN gateway at the IP network boundary to bypass the IP based WAN between V/VoIP enclaves or islands. This causes traffic to traverse a traditional long haul ISDN/TDM based circuit switched network, much as is required for DoD VoIP traffic today. This would be an approved method for VTC traffic. The down side of this method is that it does not provide the end-to-end IP solution mandated by DoD net-centricity goals.

Another method is to actually bypass the firewall with a MCU that has connections to the "inside" and "outside" of the firewall or enclave. The MCU therefore acts as the firewall and provides a proxy function. Only VTC traffic can traverse the MCU. The proxy function is affected by default since the internal and external calls are terminated on the MCU and no direct IP traffic using non-VTC protocols traverses the MCU. This can effectively solve the NAT problem as well. A normal proxy would be placed in the firewall's DMZ; however, doing this with the MCU will not solve the "open ports in the firewall" problem unless the "inside" connection is made directly to the LAN. While internal and external access to this MCU could be controlled by gatekeepers and possibly routing, this method may not meet DoD requirements for enclave boundary protection. The down side of this method is that MCUs and gatekeepers are expensive and a set would be needed at each enclave boundary requiring VTC traversal.

Due to the problems with crossing enclave boundaries and firewalls with RTS protocols, major VTC vendors have developed "Firewall Traversal Technologies". While these have been proprietary innovations, these same vendors have sponsored the development of the H.460.17, H.460.18, and H.460.19 protocol standards based on their innovations. Each standard resolves a different portion of the solution to the firewall traversal problem. H.460.17 and H.460.18 deal with signaling using two different methods while H.460.19 deals with the media streams. The most common vendor implementations seem to use H.460.18/19.

Firewall traversal technologies are intended to eliminate the requirement for a RTS aware firewall by limiting the number of ports that need to be opened on the firewall and limit the IP addresses they are opened to. These technologies also deal with the NAT problem. The various vendors that offer firewall transversal products implement their solutions in different ways and with differing capabilities, while most are migrating toward or are providing H.460 support.

A full description of this subject is beyond the scope of this release or this STIG, however, a brief description is provided below.

Firewall traversal systems utilize a "traversal server" or "border controller" to coordinate the process. The border controller sits on the public side of the firewall or in its DMZ. The technology makes use of the normal firewall property of permitting outbound connections while blocking connections initiated from outside the enclave. A "traversal" aware/capable VTC endpoint or a gatekeeper inside the enclave establishes a connection outbound to the border controller (i.e., registers with the border controller). This is permitted by the firewall as with

other outbound traffic. This is the same gatekeeper Registration, Admission and Status (RAS) signaling on port 1719 normally used during endpoint registration. This signaling connection is kept alive by the internal devices and the border controller. While, normally, outgoing calls are permitted and inbound calls are blocked, inbound calls now contact the border controller which signals the call to the devices inside the enclave using the already established outbound signaling connection. This is permitted by the firewall as part of its normal "permit replies to outbound requests" behavior. Call setup using H.225 and H.245 is established outbound using one or two TCP ports. Using H.460.19, the media streams are established, again outbound, via the border controller while being multiplexed via two static UDP ports. Once again this outbound connection is also kept alive to support incoming streams as necessary. All streams from multiple endpoints can be multiplexed via the same two ports. Thus, all VTC traffic can be funneled through, or permitted through, four or five IP ports that should be restricted to the IP address of the border controller. If the border controller is placed in the DMZ, it must have an external routable address and the firewall must allow it to receive the full range of signaling and media ports (required to establish and process a call) from the "public" side of the firewall).

As an example of this, Table 6-1 shows the IP ports Tandberg uses for their solution. The ports used for H.323hostcall are dependent upon whether Tandberg's proprietary solution is used or whether the H.460.18/19 solution is used. (This information comes from the *TANDBERG Expressway and Firewalls* whitepaper.)

**Table 6-1: IP Port Numbers Used in Firewall Traversal**

Port	Protocol	Type	Direction re: CODEC In ←→ Out	Usage
1719	TCP	Static	→	H.225 Gatekeeper RAS; h323gatestat
1720 or 2776*	TCP	Static	→	H.225/Q.931 Call Setup / initiation; H.323 Host Call; H.323hostcall
2776*	UDP	Static	→	H.245/Q.931 call capabilities and control
2776*	UDP	Static	→	RTP media stream
2777*	UDP	Static	→	RTCP media stream control
* These ports are default ports used by Tandberg. They are configurable and may be different in different vendor's implementations.				

While Firewall traversal technologies are currently in use in various DoD networks, it is undetermined at this time whether these technologies are officially approved for use in DoD enclave boundaries. To resolve this problem, a risk assessment is needed that can be submitted to the DISN DAAs for approval.

Firewall traversal technologies or solutions that are used in lieu of a properly configured RTS capable/aware Application Layer Gateway/Stateful Packet Inspection Firewall must be approved for use by the DISN DAAs.

In the event firewall traversal technologies that implement a border controller or similar device are used at an enclave boundary, the border controller must be placed in the DMZ of that boundary so access to the border controller can be controlled and it can be protected from

external threats. This device is to be treated as any other externally facing device or server (e.g., web, FTP server, etc.). This is per the Network Infrastructure and Enclave STIGs.

#### 6.4 IP Based Ports and Protocols Used In VTC

Table 6-2 provides an overall listing of the IP ports and protocols typically utilized by IP based VTC systems. This information, while typical and comprehensive, may not be all inclusive and may not include all ports or ranges used by all vendors. Some vendors use different ranges within their different product lines. While some of ranges are noted, all may not have been captured. The table indicates the PPS that are typically required to be open in a firewall to allow calls to be completed successfully. Some of these are opened and closed as needed while others are static. Those not marked as such typically remain inside the enclave.

**Table 6-2: IP Port Numbers Used in Video Teleconferencing**

Endpoint Registration and Call Setup/Control					
Port	Protocol	Type	Direction re: CODEC In ↔ Out	Usage	Vendor
↔ * Ports typically required to be open in a firewall in order to place and receive VTC calls to/from outside the enclave.					
161	UDP	Static	↔	SNMP Broadcast (Endpoint Discovery)	Tandberg Aethra
389	TCP	Dynamic	↔	LDAP - ILS registration	Polycom VCON
1002	TCP	Dynamic	↔	Site Server Registration (Windows 2000 Built-in LDAP)	VCON
1300	TCP/UDP	Static	↔	H.323 Host Call Secure; h323hostcallsc	Polycom
1718	UDP	Static	↔ *	Gatekeeper Discovery; h323gatedisc Sent to broadcast address 224.0.1.41:1718	All
1719	UDP	Static	↔ *	H.225 Gatekeeper RAS; h323gatestat	All
1720	TCP	Static	↔ *	H.323 Host Call; H.225/Q.931 Call Setup / initiation; H.323hostcall	All
11720	TCP/UDP	Static	↔ *	H.323 Host Call Alternate; H.225/Q.931 Call Setup; H.323hostcallalt	Polycom
1731	TCP/UDP	Static	↔ *	Audio Call Setup (VoIP); msiccp	Polycom
5060	TCP/UDP	Static	↔ *	Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) - Emerging use in VTC	Tandberg Polycom Aethra
Session Control (At beginning and end)					
1024 - 65535	TCP	Dynamic	↔ *	H.245/Q.931 call capabilities and control; Overall range; Tandberg B1/B2 Software; Polycom can limit	All Some limited.
Session Media					
Port	Protocol	Type	Direction re: CODEC In ↔ Out	Usage	Vendor
1024 - 65535	UDP	Dynamic	↔ *	Overall range of ports used for RTP/ RTSP & SRTP/SRTCP streams carrying the following: Voice streams, Video streams. Data / FECC streams (sometimes separate)  Stream = RTP on random odd port ; RTSP on next higher even port Each stream type requires a transmit stream and a receive stream for 6 (8) total streams = 12 (16) ports	All with some limiting their range.

1503	TCP	Static	↔ *	T.120 Whiteboard and application/file sharing in a multipoint conference; Databeam imtc-mcs	All using T.120
<b>Session Media &amp; Control - Limited Per Vendor Product / Software</b>					
NOTE: To limit the impact on firewalls and enclave boundary protection, some vendors typically limit the dynamic UDP port ranges used for H.245 messages and RTP/SRTP streams. These ranges vary from version to version of endpoint software or by endpoint product line. They also vary depending on the particular infrastructure item.					
Port	Protocol	Type	Direction re: CODEC In ↔ Out	Usage	Vendor
2326 - 2500	UDP	Dynamic	↔ *	B1/B2 Software	Tandberg
2326 - 2341	UDP	Dynamic	↔ *	B3, B4, B5, B6, E1, B7, E2 software Point-to-Point	Tandberg
5555 - 5556/5560 /5565/5574	TCP	Dynamic	↔ *	H.245/Q.931 call capabilities and control Upper port depends upon software version and Point-to-point vs. multipoint	Tandberg
2326 - 2473/75	UDP	Dynamic	↔ *	RTP/SRTP - B3, B4, B5, B6, E1, B7, E2 software Multipoint - integrated MCU	Tandberg
2326 - 2341	UDP	Dynamic	↔ *	RTP/SRTP - MXP Endpoints F1 software and F2 -F5 software Using Bidirectional UDP Ports	Tandberg
2326 - 2333	UDP	Dynamic	↔ *	RTP/SRTP - Personal Endpoints L1 - L4 software Using Bidirectional UDP Ports	Tandberg
5555 - 5587	TCP	Dynamic	↔ *	H.245/Q.931 call capabilities and control TANDBERG MCU and Gateway	Tandberg
2326 - 2837	UDP	Dynamic	↔ *	RTP/SRTP - TANDBERG MCU and Gateway	Tandberg
5555 - 6555	TCP	Dynamic	↔ *	H.245/Q.931 call capabilities and control TANDBERG MPS Gateway	Tandberg
2326 - 6933	UDP	Dynamic	↔ *	RTP/SRTP - TANDBERG MPS Gateway	Tandberg
32767 - 65535	TCP	Dynamic	↔ *	H.245/Q.931 call capabilities and control TANDBERG Video Portal (TVP) & 3G Gateway	Tandberg
25000 - 27000	UDP	Dynamic	↔ *	RTP/SRTP - TANDBERG Video Portal (TVP) & 3G Gateway	Tandberg
3230 - 3235	TCP	Dynamic	↔ *	H.245/Q.931 call capabilities and control TANDBERG Content Server	Tandberg
3230 - 3259	UDP	Dynamic	↔ *	RTP/SRTP - TANDBERG Content Server	Tandberg
15000 - 16800	TCP	Dynamic	↔ *	H.225/Q.931 Call Setup TANDBERG Border Controller	Tandberg
19000 - 20800	TCP	Dynamic	↔ *	H.245/Q.931 call capabilities and control TANDBERG Border Controller	Tandberg
50000 - 52400	UDP	Dynamic	↔ *	RTP/SRTP - TANDBERG Border Controller	Tandberg
1024 - 65535	UDP	Dynamic	↔ *	RTP/SRTP - V and VSX series endpoints; Can be limited	Polycom
3230 - 3235/3247	UDP	Dynamic	↔ *	RTP/SRTP - V series Audio and Video	Polycom
5004 - 6004	UDP	Dynamic	↔ *	RTP/SRTP	VCON
49152 - 49139/59	UDP	Dynamic	↔ *	RTP/SRTP	Sony
3230 - 3235	TCP	Dynamic	↔ *	H.245/Q.931 call capabilities and control	Polycom
5004 - 6004	TCP	Dynamic	↔ *	H.245/Q.931 call capabilities and control	VCON
2253 - 2255	TCP	Dynamic	↔ *	H.245/Q.931 call capabilities and control	Sony
3230-	TCP	Dynamic	↔ *	H.225(Q.931) call control	Aethra

65535				H.245 media call control SIP call control The maximum number of TCP port depends by the terminal capabilities (number of simultaneous H.323/SIP calls). The max value is shown by user interface, in each platform.	
default value, can be modified by user					
<b>Streaming Media</b>					
Port	Protocol	Type	Direction re: CODEC In ←→ Out	Usage	Vendor
2979	TCP/UDP	Static	→	H.263 Video Streaming	Polycom
970 - 973 22232 - 22237	UDP	Static	→	RTP/RTCP Audio / Video	Tandberg
974	UDP	Static	→	Session Announcement Protocol (SAP) (Stream is directed to 224.2.127.254:9875)	Tandberg
554 - 557	UDP	Static	→	RTP/RTCP Audio / Video Only even UDP ports (RTP) are used. Can be modified by configuration.	Aethra
<b>Device Management</b>					
21	TCP	Static	↔	FTP	Polycom Tandberg
24	TCP	Static	↔	FTP API Control	Polycom
1026	TCP	Static	↔	FTP / Data	Tandberg
22	TCP	Static	↔	SSH	Tandberg
23	TCP	Static	↔	TELNET	Polycom Aethra
23	TCP	Static	↔	Telnet & NTP listening socket	Tandberg
57	TCP	Static	↔	Telnet Challenge	Tandberg
80	TCP	Static	↔	HTTP	Polycom Tandberg Aethra
443	TCP	Static	↔	HTTPS	Tandberg Aethra
123	UDP	Static	↔	NTP	Tandberg Aethra
161	UDP	Static	←	SNMP Queries	Tandberg Aethra
162	UDP	Static	→	SNMP Traps	Tandberg Aethra
962	UDP	Static	→	SNMP Traps	Tandberg
137/138	UDP	Static	↔	NetBIOS TMS end user authentication	Tandberg
963	TCP	Static	→	Netlog	Tandberg
964	TCP	Static	↔	FTP/data	Tandberg
22136	TCP	Static	↔	VCON MXM - Remote VCON Endpoint Admin	VCON
26505	TCP	Static	↔	VCON MXM - Remote Console	VCON
9131	UDP	Static	→	AMX Device Discovery (239.255.250.250:9131)	Tandberg
3478 + one dynamic UDP port, typically 3479	UDP	Static + dynamic	↔	STUN Client	Aethra
69 + dynamic UDP port,	UDP	Static + dynamic	↔	TFTP Client	Aethra
<b>Presentation Sharing PC to CODEC Virtual Connection</b>					

Port	Protocol	Type	Direction re: CODEC In ↔ Out	Usage	Vendor
965/1027	TCP	Static	↔	Virtual Network Computing (VNC )	Tandberg
50120	TCP	Static	↔	DataConf Service	Aethra
50121	TCP	Static	↔	DataConf Service Data	Aethra
55001	TCP	Static	↔	Web Applet Service	Aethra
55002	TCP	Static	↔	Videosurveillance service	Aethra
55003	TCP	Static	↔	AT Command Service	Aethra
55004	TCP	Static	↔	AES Test Service	Aethra
55006	TCP	Static	↔	PowerPoint Client Service	Aethra
55096	TCP	Static	↔	TProfile Service	Aethra
55097	TCP	Static	↔	Download Service	Aethra
55098	TCP	Static	↔	Download Remote Service	Aethra
55099	TCP	Static	↔	Download Service	Aethra
60100	UDP	Static	↔	Vega Data Channel (Proprietary)	Aethra

## 6.5 DoD Ports and Protocols Management

DoDI 8550.1 Ports, Protocols, and Services Management (PPSM) is the DoD's policy on IP Ports, Protocols, and Services (PPS). It controls the PPS that are permitted or approved to cross DoD network boundaries. Standard well-known and registered IP ports and associated protocols and services are assessed for vulnerabilities and threats to the entire Global Information Grid (GIG) which includes the DISN backbone networks. The results are published in a Vulnerability Assessment (VA) report. Each port and protocol is given a rating of green, yellow, or red in association with each of the 16 defined boundary types. Green means the protocol is relatively secure and is approved to cross the associated boundary without restrictions. Yellow means the protocol can be used if required mitigations are used. Red means that the protocol is not secure or approved. Typically "red PPS" carry a two-year removal notice. Some of these have mitigations listed in their VA that must be used if the protocol is used during its remaining life. The information regarding the assessed ports and protocols and the defined boundaries is published in the PPS Assurance Categories Assignment List (CAL). This is updated every month or so. PPSs that are not assessed or listed are assumed to carry an assignment of red. See the Enclave and Network Infrastructure STIGS, the 8550.1, and the latest PPS CAL for a more complete discussion of this DoD program and policy.

### 6.5.1 VTC ports and protocols in the PPS CAL

Virtually all PPSs required to establish a H.323 VTC call are red for all 16 boundaries. Only a few have been assessed and listed in the CAL. Those that have been assessed carry restrictions for their use, while some carry a two year removal status. Table 6-3 provides details for these PPSs as of this writing.

**Table 6-3: H.323 VTC PPS status in the PPS CAL**

Port	Protocol	Type	Usage	Restrictions and Comments
1718	UDP	Static	H323gatedisc H.225 Gatekeeper RAS	Not Listed and no VA Presumed red on all boundaries
1719	UDP	Static	h323gatestat H.225 Gatekeeper RAS	Not Listed and no VA Presumed red on all boundaries
1720	TCP	Static	H323hostcall H.225/Q.931 Call Setup	VA dated 2/15/05 CAL date 2/17/05 red on all boundaries - NO 2 year removal noted Restrictions / Mitigations - "Restrict by source and destination filtering." - "Ensure compliance with all mandatory vulnerability patches and actions as required by the DOD Directive 8530 and CJCSM 6510.0." - "Encryption must use FIPS compliant algorithms for sensitive information." - "Disable use of Audio and Video unless using it across an approved VPN or an NSA Type 1 encrypted network." - "Require all collaboration take place in attended mode." - "Disable use of Remote Desktop Sharing feature." - "Place restrictions on what programs can be shared using NMRK (Resource Kit)."  Vulnerabilities noted: - "Denial of Service" - "Multiple Vendors H.323 implementation Vuls; discusses H.225 RE VoIP; Issue published 1/13/2004" - "NetScreen H.323 Control Session Denial Of Service Vulnerability 11/25/2002" - "Avirt Voice HTTP GET Remote Buffer Overrun Vulnerability 2/23/2004" - "Numerous Microsoft OS & NetMeeting vuls"
1024 - 65535	TCP	Dynamic	H.245/Q.931 call capabilities and control	Not Listed and no VA Presumed red on all boundaries
1024 - 65535	UDP	Dynamic	RTP Voice, Video, Data, FECC streams	VA dated 11/15/06 CAL date 11/16/06 red on all boundaries VA notes 2 year removal from 11/16/06 Restrictions / Mitigations - "Use the more secure SRTP protocol."  Vulnerabilities noted: - "Weak Encryption Method" (DES) - "Lack of Congestion Control"
1024 - 65535	UDP	Dynamic	RTCP Voice, Video, Data, FECC stream control	VA dated 11/15/06 CAL date 11/16/06 red on all boundaries VA notes 2 year removal from 11/16/06 VA Restrictions / Mitigations - "Use the more secure SRTCP protocol." - "Restrict by source and destination filtering." - "Ensure compliance with all mandatory vulnerability patches and actions as required by the DoD Directive 8530 and CJCSM 6510.01.  No vulnerabilities noted
1503	TCP	Static	imtc-mcs (Databeam) T.120 Whiteboard and application/file sharing in a multipoint conference	VA dated 2/15/05 CAL date 2/17/05 red on all boundaries - NO 2 year removal noted Restrictions / Mitigations - "Ensure compliance with all mandatory vulnerability patches and actions as required by the DoD Directive 8530 and CJCSM 6510.01." - "Restrict by source and destination filtering." - "Disable use of Audio and Video unless using it across an approved VPN or an NSA Type 1 encrypted network."

				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- "Require all collaboration take place in attended mode"</li> <li>- "Disable use of Remote Desktop Sharing feature"</li> <li>- "Place restrictions on what programs can be shared using NMRK (Resource Kit)."</li> </ul> <p>Vulnerabilities noted:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- "Denial of Service"</li> <li>- "Several Microsoft OS &amp; NetMeeting vuls"- ""</li> <li>- "NetScreen H.323 Control Session Denial Of Service Vulnerability 11/25/2002"</li> </ul>
1024 - 65535  Listed as SRTP 5004 only SRTCP 5005 only	UDP	Dynamic	<p>SRTP/SRTCP Voice, Video, Data, FECC stream &amp; control</p> <p>SRTCP no VA</p>	<p>Red on 1, 2, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14; yellow on all others</p> <p>Restrictions / Mitigations</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- "Restrict access to authorized servers only."</li> <li>- "Restrict by source and destination filtering."</li> <li>- "Ensure compliance with all mandatory vulnerability patches and actions as required by the DoD Directive 8530 and CJCSM 6510.01."</li> <li>- "NIST FIPS 140-2 validated cryptography SHALL be used to implement encryption, key exchange, digital signature, or hash for all sensitive information. Newer standards SHALL be applied as they become available. "</li> </ul> <p>No vulnerabilities noted</p>

The red status on all boundaries as noted in the PPS VAs and CAL seems to indicate that normal IP based VTC traffic is not permitted to cross a DISN WAN. This is not the case when inspecting the associated restrictions and mitigations. The net result is that this traffic is to be encrypted along with being restricted by source and destination addresses. Additionally platforms and applications using and passing these PPSs must maintain up to date patch status.

Most of the restrictions noted above are covered elsewhere in this STIG. Further information and additional specific STIG guidance on this subject may be provided in a future release of this or a similar/associated document.

**6.5.2 PPS registration**

A portion of the DoDI 8550.1 PPS policy requires registration of those PPS that cross any of the boundaries defined by the policy that are "visible to DoD-managed components". The following PPS registration requirement applies to VTC traffic that crosses the IP based Enclave boundary to the DISN WAN or another enclave.



## 7. SECURE/NON-SECURE VTC SECURITY

This section will encompass requirements (not covered elsewhere) for the use and implementation of secure, as well as secure/nonsecure VTC endpoints and HUBs that process classified information i.e., support classified conferences. At this time, this section only provides a description of this type of VTC system.

### 7.1 Classified / Un-Classified Conferencing Systems

The previous discussions can relate to both un-classified and classified conferences. All classified conferences require NSA type-1 cryptography and key management. The implementation of this cryptography depends upon the transmission method and the network that is carrying the transmitted information. VTUs that support both classified and un-classified conferences are sometimes referred to as secure/non-secure devices or systems.

Dial-up VTC systems can support both classified and un-classified conferences if properly equipped. Dial-up conferences can be established either in an unclassified mode or in a classified mode. A special A/B switch is used to switch the crypto device into the EIA-530 serial connection between the CODEC and a required external IMUX. An additional piece of equipment is required which is called a dial isolator. This is a device that breaks the EIA-366 dialing information connection between the CODEC and the IMUX when the IMUX signals the dial isolator that the call is connected. Both the A/B switch and dial isolator are TEMPEST certified devices since they are required to provide proper high isolation between the clear-text information in the CODEC and the cipher-text information passing through the IMUX and out to the ISDN lines.

IP based VTC systems are typically connected directly to an IP network that determines the classification level, up to which, a classified VTC can be held. In other words the VTU inherits the classification level of the network to which it is attached. VTUs can be fitted with a special A/B switch to permit the VTU to be used on a classified or un-classified network. An A/B switch can also be used to permit a VTU to be used on different classified networks having different classification levels. Such an A/B switch must be rigorously tested and approved for Multi Level Security (MLS) applications because it touches two networks of differing classifications and must prevent the passing of traffic between these networks. Such an A/B switch performs an IA function as its primary purpose (i.e., maintaining the separation of the networks having different classifications). It is therefore subject to NIAP Common Criteria Validation in accordance with DoDI 8500.2 IA control DCAS-1 and NSTISSP No. 11.


An additional concern when switching a VTU from a classified network to an unclassified network is the possible retention of classified information within the CODEC. This information could be contained in the address book or in log files, or possibly in some other memory location. To eliminate this problem, the CODEC must be flushed of this information. Rebooting the CODEC by cycling the power off, and then on with an appropriate time delay, will clear any information stored in volatile memory. This will not, however, clear information in non-volatile memory where the address book and logs would be stored. To overcome this problem special secure / non-secure switching systems have been developed that delete files stored in non-

volatile memory that might contain classified information before cycling the power on the CODEC and subsequently connecting it to the unclassified network.

Figure 7-1 illustrates a secure/non-secure VTU along with its optional network connections. The optional connections shown are mutually exclusive since a VTU must not be simultaneously connected to a classified and unclassified network. This means that the VTU cannot be connected to a classified IP based network while also being connected to the dial-up network which is unclassified.

Multipoint secure/classified conferences require that each MCU port be equipped with an appropriate crypto device (dependent upon connection type) which decrypts the VTC stream before the MCU can join them together. This applies to IP based, as well as dial-up connections. An MCU must be dedicated to each classification level and/or classified network supported by the facility. This is because the MCU is a VTC network infrastructure device with a number of connections to the supported network (much like a LAN switch or router). If a single MCU were to support two or more networks having different classification levels, an A/B switch would be required for each port/connection on the MCU just as is the case with a single endpoint/CODEC. All A/B switches would have to be switched in unison to maintain separation of the two networks and not cause a connection to be made between them through the MCU. This is not practical and is dangerous to the maintenance of network separation. Mitigation for this would be to have all MCU and network switch ports on patch panels. The MCU, unclassified, and classified networks appear on separate patch panels. The MCU would be patched to either the unclassified OR classified network. An SOP would need to be implemented whereby all patch cords are removed prior to any being connected to the other network.

Figure 7-1: Secure / Non-Secure VTU Components and Connections



## 8. VTC HUB/MCU SECURITY

This section will encompass requirements (not covered elsewhere) for Media Conferencing Units, Gateways, scheduling systems, etc., as used in enterprise level VTC applications/systems, as well as service provider hubs, such as DVS-II.

### 8.1 Access Control for Multipoint Conferences

Access control must be exercised over participants joining multipoint conferences. Attendees and/or endpoints must be pre-authorized or pre-registered. In this way, conference/meeting organizers can control who has access to sensitive or classified information based upon validated clearance and need-to-know. Unrestricted access or the use of a meeting password that is reused and/or well-known can lead to a security incident where information is improperly disclosed to unauthorized individuals not having appropriate clearance or need-to-know.

In a previous topic, the access control required was discussed for multipoint conferences hosted by a VTC endpoint with an integrated MCU. Typically access control for such meetings is handled manually by the operator of the hosting VTU calling the participants and then joining them to the conference. This is positive access control with the conference host controlling who has access to the session and being responsible, therefore, for the conferees need-to-know or authorization to receive conference information. Additionally, if call-in access is supported and approved, a onetime use meeting password is required.

Multipoint conferences hosted on a MCU appliance or network element must also perform access control over who can join a meeting. This includes employing proper practices for distributing conference information, as well as for assigning access codes. If access control is not exercised, anyone who knows any phone number or IP address on the MCU can "dial-in" any time and access whatever meeting is being hosted on the MCU at the given time. This cannot be permitted.

MCU Access control can be performed in various ways that may differ from vendor's product to vendor's product. Typically, MCU access is controlled by an H.323 gatekeeper, which uses H.225 gatekeeper RAS messages between itself and its endpoints. A combination of access control lists on the MCU and gatekeeper can also limit access. A full description of this process is beyond the scope of this release of this STIG but a brief description follows along with an issue. Further information can be found in several books and tutorials that are available in both print and on the web.

H.323 gatekeepers provide access control for VTC network infrastructure devices, such as MCUs and gateways to VTC endpoints. Using H.225 an endpoint can discover a gatekeeper and register with it. The endpoint is identified by the gatekeeper by a "gatekeeper password" which is essentially the endpoint ID. The gatekeeper provides address translation and bandwidth management. Once registered with the gatekeeper an endpoint must ask permission of the gatekeeper to make a call. If the available VTC bandwidth is used or limited, the gatekeeper can reject the request or negotiate a lower bandwidth. This acts as part of the access control mechanism for the MCU and works in combination with a scheduling application. The rest of the

MCU access control equation is preregistration of the endpoint IDs when scheduling a conference. Preregistration of endpoint IDs for specific conferences is required because there are typically no meeting passwords and the phone numbers or IP addresses of the MCU ports don't change between sessions. Additionally (and here's the issue mentioned above) people are not authenticated only endpoints are. The endpoint ID is critical in this access control process. The endpoint ID is entered (pre-configured) in the system for a specific scheduled conference. The system only permits the endpoint to access the MCU during the scheduled time of the conference.

This discussion also applies to ad hoc conferences and "standing" conferences. A standing conference is one where MCU facilities are dedicated to a conference that is operational all of the time or one that is regularly scheduled to be operational for certain time periods. The implementation of a standing conference permits conferees to join the conference at will or as needed to discuss a current topic or mission. Standing conferences are implemented for many reasons. Standing conferences are more vulnerable to compromise than one time scheduled events. Extra care must be exercised regarding access control to these conferences.

## **8.2 Conference Scheduling Systems**

Conference scheduling systems are used to ensure MCU and network facilities are available when a conference is going to occur. This is done by a reservation process whereby the facilities are reserved for the conference. A scheduling system can also be used to send invitations, typically via email, to conferees containing meeting access information. Access to the scheduling system is handled in one of three ways. The first is by an administrator or helpdesk representative. A meeting organizer contacts the help desk and the helpdesk representative interacts with the scheduling system. The second and third methods of accessing the scheduling system are user based. The meeting organizer (user) accesses the scheduling system via a web page and browser or via another collaboration application, such as MS Outlook or IBM Sametime (and/or others).

### **8.2.1 Scheduling system access control**

Access control to the conference scheduling system must be exercised and limited to authorized individuals. This is accomplished in different ways depending upon the access method. Scheduling systems accessed by users or administrators via a web interface must comply with all of the requirements for a web server and/or applications server to include DoD access control (e.g., DoD PKI) and auditing requirements for such devices/systems. Scheduling systems accessed via a collaboration tool must minimally utilize the access control required for accessing the collaboration application. Since an authorized user of a collaboration tool may or may not have the right to schedule VTC conferences, the scheduling application should receive user credentials from the collaboration application to determine authorization or the right must be controlled by the collaboration application. Scheduling systems accessed by administrators using other methods must also employ access control and auditing meeting DoD requirements.